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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past quarter century, the United States Courts of Appeals
have been experiencing a well-publicized caseload crisis.1 Filings
increased from 47,000 in 1992 to almost 68,500 in 2005 while the
number of authorized judges has remained constant.2 Unlike the
Supreme Court, which by virtue of its discretionary jurisdiction3 has a
highly effective internal mechanism for regulating its workload,4 the
federal appellate courts are in many respects powerless to combat the
rising tide. Instead, their primary source of relief is legislative action,
through measures like the tightening of jurisdictional requirements5 and
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1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59–93
(1985); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts,
1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25–26 (discussing federal caseload crisis); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future
for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 1485, 1487–91 (1995) (same).
2. Appellate Judicial Caseload Profile Report (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgibin/cmsa2005.pl (click on the “Generate” button); Appellate Judicial Caseload Profile Report
(1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa.pl (same).
3. Although not unlimited, the Supreme Court has significant ability via the writ of
certiorari to control the cases it hears. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion
Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1896–1900 (2004); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
4. The Supreme Court’s discretion to accept cases has resulted in a substantial decline in the
number of published opinions in the last sixty years. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 66–67 (2005).
5. Between 1935 and 1981, at least sixty-four bills were introduced that proposed stripping
federal jurisdiction over various categories of cases, and recently Congress has debated four new
bills limiting or removing jurisdiction of the federal courts. Travis Christopher Barham, Congress
Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away: Jurisdiction Withdrawal and the Constitution, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1139, 1143–48 (2005). Many of these bills were motivated by political considerations
rather than judicial workload concerns.
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the addition of new judicial positions.6 No such measure has been used
sufficiently to overcome the increases in case filings, and other
legislative action has effectively counteracted their limited use.7
The lack of direct methods of caseload control has not stopped the
appellate courts from taking various steps to address the problem. In
recent years, most appellate courts have instituted or enhanced their
mediation and settlement programs in an effort to remove cases from the
docket,8 many have increased their use of unpublished opinions to
dispose of cases with greater efficiency,9 and some have aggressively
promoted arbitration as an alternative to litigation.10

6. Congress added thirty-five judgeships in 1978, twenty-four judgeships in 1984, and
eleven judgeships in 1990. Congress also created the Federal Circuit in 1982 with twelve judges.
U.S. Court of Appeals: Additional Judgeships Authorized by Judgeship Acts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablec.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
7. Most significantly, Congress has expanded federal jurisdiction over time by creating new
federal causes of action. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal
Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1148–49, 1152–53 (1994); Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges
and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 388 (2004). Another problem
has been the increased politicization of court appointments, which has led to many authorized
judgeships sitting unfilled for lengthy periods of time. See David S. Law, Appointing Federal
Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479 (2005);
see also Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum, 2005 UTAH L. REV.
743. And the courts themselves have played a role in increasing the scope of federal jurisdiction by
recognizing new or expanded causes of action. See Stern, supra at 388–89.
8. All thirteen circuit courts have instituted alternative dispute resolution programs pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which provides for alternative means of settling disputes
at the appellate level with the assistance of a court appointed neutral party. ROBERT J. NIEMIC,
MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (1997). The Ninth
Circuit instituted its appellate mediation program in 1984 and in 1994 achieved a 73 percent
disposition rate by settling 598 cases. Ignazcio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation—“Settling” the Last
Frontier of ADR, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177, 205 (2005).
9. The dramatic rise of unpublished opinions comes as a result of a push in the 1970s to
establish criteria for when opinions should remain unpublished. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at
Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 200–
01 (2001). Since then, unpublished opinions have increased from 11.25 percent of total opinions in
1981 to 81.6 percent in 2005, with the number increasing each year and often reaching over 90
percent in the Fourth Circuit. See U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 42 tbl.S-3, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/s3.pdf; Hannon, supra at 203; see also POSNER, supra
note 1, at 162–71. However, the effectiveness of unpublished opinions as a time-saving measure
may well be undercut by the recently adopted Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which
allows citation to unpublished opinions as precedential authority. Edward R. Becker et al., Citation
of Unpublished Opinions: The Appellate Judges Speak, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2005)
(arguing that permitting citation to unpublished opinions will require judges to spend more time on
those opinions).
10. Courts are upholding arbitration awards with narrow review to ensure that arbitration is
an alternative step, not another layer in litigation. B.L. Harbert Int’l v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d
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This Article focuses on a different kind of approach used by
appellate courts to alleviate the caseload crunch. The body of procedures
that govern an appeal in the federal courts is comprised of several
sources, of which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, and Appellate Procedure are only the most obvious and
visible. Each of those sets of rules is mandatory and fixed, and courts
have little power to change them.11 By contrast, a court’s internal rules
and procedures are far more malleable. Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 47 permits appellate courts to introduce local rules and
procedures, so long as (1) they are consistent with the mandatory
procedural rules and (2) an opportunity for notice and comment is
provided.12 The United States Code further requires each court of
appeals to establish an advisory committee “for the study of the rules of
practice and internal operating procedures of such court.”13 Notice and
comment periods and advisory committees aside, Rule 47 clearly places
the ultimate authority for rulemaking in the hands of the judges
themselves.14
Local rulemaking authority is not limitless by any stretch, but it does
provide a space in which courts can act directly and with relative ease.
And there is some evidence that courts are maneuvering within that
space to address caseload concerns. This Article takes a close look at one
example of such an effort. In 1986, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals used its rulemaking authority to alter the internal

905, 906–07 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Cyctyc Corp. v. DEKA Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 33
(1st Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that court review of arbitral awards is narrower than review of lower
court decisions by appellate courts).
11. I say little power rather than no power to account for obvious caveats. First, courts and
judges can (and do) promote modifications to the rules, either by writing opinions that point out
perceived weaknesses in the rules as constituted or by engaging in more informal advocacy such as
giving speeches, writing articles, or placing phone calls. This may be viewed as power to change the
rules, but it is power of an indirect and uncertain variety. Second, courts can control the formal
procedural rules to the extent that their terms are open to interpretation. But interpretations that
deviate too far afield are likely to be noticed and policed by the Supreme Court. A prominent recent
example of judicial efforts along these lines was the attempts by lower courts—followed by
rejections by the Supreme Court—to impose heightened pleading requirements in certain contexts.
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
12. Fed. R. App. P. 47; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000) (providing statutory authority for
courts of appeals to introduce rules and procedures).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b). Section 2077(a) adds the further requirement that a court’s rules and
procedures be published. Id. § 2077(a).
14. Fed. R. App. P. 47(a)(1) (requiring only a majority vote by active regular service judges
to promulgate local rules and procedures).
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procedure for announcing the composition of merits panels to litigants.15
Prior to that year, all federal circuits announced the composition of
appellate panels only shortly before a scheduled oral argument. Under
the D.C. Circuit’s modified procedure, panel announcement in civil
appeals instead comes within sixty days of filing and accompanies the
initial scheduling of oral argument.16 As a result, litigants receive panel
composition information up to six months in advance of oral argument.
No official explanation accompanied the introduction of the new
procedure, but at least one judge then serving on the court has provided
an informal account. According to Judge Harry T. Edwards, the primary
motivation was the “convenience of the parties.”17 But a secondary
motivation also existed:
It occurred to us that this false assumption [that panel composition
permitted prediction of the outcome] might lead some parties to settle
their claims to avoid certain panels. We were happy to accommodate
those who might thus settle their cases and thereby reduce our
caseload.18

15. The versions of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 and 28 U.S.C. § 2077 applicable
in 1986 were different from the current versions, but not appreciably so. An advisory committee was
still required for the courts of appeals (although not for district courts), and a vote by the majority of
judges in regular active service was still sufficient to amend the rules so long as a period for notice
and comment was provided.
16. “Ordinarily, the Court discloses merits panels to counsel in the order setting the case for
oral argument.” U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF
PRACTICE
AND
INTERNAL
PROCEDURES
§
II.B.8(a)
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/internet.nsf/Content/VL+-+RPP+-+Handbook+of+
Practice+and+Internal+Procedures [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE]. “In civil cases, oral
argument dates and panels are usually set before the briefs are filed.” Id. at § IV.A.3; see also
Patricia M. Wald, “. . . Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief,” 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1138
(1992) (“We took a chance on disclosing the identities of merits panels, as well as the dates of oral
argument, within sixty days of filing.”).
17. J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Circuit Practices: An Appendix to Neutral
Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals n.17 (2000), http://www.law.du.edu/
courts/Jones_article_webmaterial_2000.htm (citing Letter from Harry T. Edwards, Chief Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, to J. Robert Brown, Professor, University of Denver College of Law
(Sept. 24, 1998)).
18. Id.; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 853–54 (“[I]n the D.C. Circuit, the names of the judges
who are assigned to hear an appeal are announced well in advance to encourage . . . settlements. By
blaming their withdrawal on the composition of judicial panels, rather than on the merits of their
cases, lawyers are able to save face while simultaneously freeing the court system of unnecessary
burdens. If this provides a palatable excuse and thus increases settlements, then the false image of a
politicized judiciary may have some salutary effect.”).
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For almost twenty years, no other circuits followed the D.C. Circuit’s
move toward earlier announcement. Then, in 2004, the Federal Circuit
provisionally adopted a rule change that moved the announcement of
panels to an earlier stage in the proceedings. Rather than announce panel
assignment on the morning of the argument, the new rule provided for
that announcement one week in advance of the argument.19 Shortly
before the actual adoption of this procedural change, Polk Wagner and
Lee Petherbridge discussed it in hypothetical terms and concluded—
echoing Judge Edwards—that earlier announcement “would be a simple,
cost-free way for the court to increase the settlement rate.”20 There were
early signs that the new procedure was indeed affecting litigant behavior.
Most notably, in Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Inc.,21 the parties informed the
court during oral argument that Pfizer had executed a covenant not to sue
for patent infringement. The covenant not to sue rendered the appeal
moot, and the court promptly issued a short opinion dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction. There is good reason to believe that Pfizer’s
action was in direct response to panel announcement.22 But rather than
being viewed as an indication of success, at least one member of the
panel lamented the result, remarking during argument that “maybe
posting paneling is a very, very bad thing.”23 And it would appear that
Judge Mayer was not alone in that sentiment; as of February 6, 2006, the
19. Although this change is noteworthy for present purposes because it shifted panel
announcement to an earlier point in the appeals process, it does not come close to replicating the
D.C. Circuit’s extreme policy. Instead, the provisional rule brought the Federal Circuit’s policy in
line with the policies of many circuits that announce panels shortly before the scheduled argument.
See Howard J. Bashman, Who’s on the Argument Panel: Why Ignorance Isn’t Bliss, LAW.COM, Apr.
3, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1143812716056 (describing announcement policies).
20. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1175 (2004). Unlike Judge Edwards,
however, Wagner and Petherbridge ultimately cautioned against adoption of an early announcement
procedure—despite its promise as a caseload-reducing tool. For further discussion of their reasons
for sounding cautionary notes, see infra Part IV.A.
21. 125 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
22. In Apotex, the issue related to whether the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) by itself creates a reasonable apprehension of suit. In an earlier case, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA v. Pfizer, Inc., the Federal Circuit had held that it does not. 395 F.3d 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Judge Mayer, who dissented in Teva, was assigned to the Apotex panel, a sign that
perhaps the Teva holding was insecure. The covenant not to sue was entered into after the panel was
announced.
Dennis
Crouch,
Appeals
Court
Dismisses
Apotex
Case
Against Pfizer’s Quinapril Patent, PATENTLY-O, Apr. 11, 2005, http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2005/04/appeals_court_d.html; Dennis Crouch, CAFC Judge Mayer: “Maybe Posting
Paneling Is a Very, Very Bad Thing,” PATENTLY-O, Mar. 14, 2005, http://www.patentlyo
.com/patent/2005/03/cafc_judges_que.html [hereinafter Crouch, CAFC Judge Mayer].
23. Crouch, CAFC Judge Mayer, supra note 22.
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court has reverted to its original procedure of announcing panels on the
day of a scheduled argument.24
The recent Federal Circuit experimentation with—and rejection of—
early panel announcement, along with the ever-increasing pressures for
courts to find ways to handle cases efficiently, occasions a new
examination of the effectiveness and effect of early announcement rules
in particular and of local rules designed to address caseload concerns in
general. Part II.A begins by situating the D.C. Circuit procedure as a
form of “cue and response.” The belief that early panel announcement
will generate increased settlement activity is based on assumptions that
litigants will perceive the announcement as a relevant cue and that they
will respond to the cue by pursuing settlement. The rise of theoretical
and empirical accounts of the “attitudinal model” of judging provides
support for the cuing assumption because it has led to a growing
perception that the identity of the judge matters to the outcome of the
case. In the context of appeals, that translates to a perception that the
composition of judicial panels matters, due either to a simple aggregation
of the individual effects of judicial characteristics or to the combined
effect of group characteristics. Support for the response assumption
comes from the conventional law and economics theory of settlement,
which posits that settlement decisions are responsive to information
regarding likely outcome and that settlement is more likely when the
probable outcome is more certain. If the court’s cue equates to new
information that makes the probable outcome more certain, litigants
should respond, and their response should lead to settlement in at least
some cases.
Despite the fairly straightforward case for a settlement effect, Part
II.B concludes that the D.C. Circuit procedure has been only weakly
effective in those terms. I begin by comparing rates of voluntary
dismissal in civil non-administrative cases filed in the Second, Seventh,
and D.C. Circuits, and find no significant difference between the circuits.
If anything, the rate of voluntary dismissal appears lower in the D.C.
Circuit than in the other circuits studied, even when controlling for
subject matter and governmental involvement. Of course, an intercircuit
study may mislead if other differences in practice or procedure contribute
to general variances in the rate of voluntary dismissal across circuits. To
account for that possibility, I look instead at voluntary dismissal activity
24. According to Howard Bashman, the reversion to the original announcement procedure
was also motivated by a “negative reaction to an increased amount of attorney pandering at oral
argument.” See Bashman, supra note 19.
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within the D.C. Circuit alone. Of sixty-three cases in which a panel was
assigned, thirteen were dismissed voluntarily prior to oral argument.
Although there is no way to assess from docket sheet information
whether these dismissals were directly responsive to panel
announcement, that number provides at least weak support that the
announcement rule affects behavior in some cases.
Part III discusses various barriers that limit the effectiveness of early
announcement as a settlement-promoting tool. Some of these barriers
stem from failures in the content of the court’s cue, while others owe to
failures in the way litigants respond to the cue. Content barriers arise
when the actual panel composition information does not produce
significant updating relative to a litigant’s pre-announcement outcome
prediction. This is true, for example, when the announced panel is
ideologically close to the panel that would be expected given the court’s
overall composition. It is also true when litigants do not perceive the
outcome to be affected by the particulars of panel composition—in other
words, when litigants do not view the attitudinal model as operational in
practice. Response barriers arise when litigants do not perceive and
respond to the court’s cue rationally. Some litigants may simply fail to
notice the cue. More likely, many litigants may notice the cue but then
make mistakes interpreting and incorporating its content. To the extent
they occur, all of these barriers are largely intractable. This is because the
actions necessary to overcome them would require the court to take an
unacceptably active role in the dissemination and interpretation of the
announcement cue. In the end, the stubbornness of these various barriers
means that the early announcement procedure can only hope to have a
limited effect.
Part IV explores how the barriers that limit the early announcement
procedure’s effectiveness may also introduce distortions into the body of
cases that ultimately proceed to oral argument. As an example, consider
the barrier created by the fact that some panels are not particularly
predictable. This barrier is also the source of a distortion because it
means that relatively more cases involving predictable panels will settle,
and conversely that the panels hearing the cases that proceed to oral
argument will be relatively more unpredictable. Other distortions include
overrepresentation among oral argument cases of appeals that involve
unsophisticated litigants, appeals that are motivated by an interest in a
judgment per se, and appeals that are relatively non-responsive to panel
composition. Each of these distortions has the potential to create serious
problems in terms of the court’s ability to perform its adjudicative
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functions adequately. Those serious problems arise only in the extreme
case, however, and the extreme case is unlikely because the existence of
other barriers contains the severity of any one distortion. Even so,
caseload distortions as a by-product of the early announcement
procedure deserve careful attention. Because similar distortions may be
expected whenever courts introduce “cue and response” procedures, full
consideration of the desirability of such procedures should account for
them.
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT PROCEDURE: THEORY AND EFFECT
The general theory behind Judge Edwards’s belief that early
announcement will increase settlement activity is one of cue and
response: early announcement constitutes a cue to litigants, who respond
because they believe that the content of the cue is relevant. In basic
terms, early announcement is deemed a relevant cue because litigants are
assumed to perceive a relationship between the identity of judges
assigned to hear the appeal and the likely outcome of the appeal. And
litigants are expected to pursue settlement in response because settlement
decisions are related to expectations about likely outcome. If the cue and
response theory holds up in practice, we should expect that the degree of
pre-argument settlement activity will be higher when the cue is provided
than when it is not. In other words, we might expect the rate of voluntary
dismissal in the D.C. Circuit to be higher than in other circuits.
Nevertheless, I find no evidence to support this expectation. But that
result might be misleading; unmeasured variables may contribute to
intercircuit differences in settlement activity that mask the effect of the
early announcement procedure. In an attempt to better isolate the
procedure’s effect, I analyze the D.C. Circuit cases more closely and find
that the procedure may be achieving its intended effect in some cases.
A. Theory: Panel Announcement, Informational Cues, and Settlement
There is a strong predisposition in the American legal system toward
the formalist notion that judges perform their function without recourse
to personal ideology or past experience. That view is a predictable
corollary of our democratic ideals of blind justice and equality under the
law.25 So understood, the judge is “one who objectively and
25. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74–75 (1973);
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255–64 (1997); Doreen McBarnet &
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impersonally decides cases by logically deducing the correct resolution
from a definite and consistent body of legal rules.”26
Judges themselves have been among the most vigorous defenders of
the formalist model.27 In a very recent example, then-Judge Roberts
testified in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that “judges wear
black robes because it doesn’t matter who they are as individuals. That’s
not going to shape their decisionmaking. It’s their understanding of the
law that will shape their decision.”28 And Judge Edwards has argued that
“it is the law—and not the personal politics of individual judges—that
controls judicial decisionmaking in most cases resolved by the courts of
appeals.”29
Over the past century or more, this formalist vision of judges has
come under sustained attack by legal scholars and social scientists.30
Legal realists and critical legal theorists have long argued that, far from
being impersonal, judging is an endeavor acutely affected by the

Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control,
54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 871 (1991) (“[T]here is a fundamental formalism inherent in the very idea of
legal control in the liberal democratic state which makes formalist argument difficult to resist or easy
to justify.”).
26. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism,
or How Not To Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 87 (1995). For a
classic enunciation of the formalist approach, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (“[L]egal analysis . . . can and should be free from
contaminating political or ideological elements.”).
27. The judicial defense of formalism has a distinguished pedigree. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (“Courts are the mere instruments of the law,
and can will nothing. . . . Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will
of the Judge . . . .”). For a more recent Supreme Court articulation of formalist ideals, see Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 561–62 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Judges, if faithful to their
oath, approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective disposition.”).
28. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 178 (2005)
(testimony of Hon. John G. Roberts). Similarly, Patricia Wald has urged that “[t]he black robes we
wear on the bench unite us in their lack of distinguishability; they make a simple but striking point:
We are neither Democratic judges nor Republican judges but, simply, United States judges.” Patricia
M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 240 (1999).
29. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the ‘Politics’ of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985); see also
Bartlett v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243–44 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc) (defending the “integrity of panel judges, who are both intelligent enough to
know the law and conscientious enough to abide by their oath to uphold it”).
30. For early formulations of the argument that judicial attitudes affect decisionmaking, see
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 116 (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 277–78 (1929);
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 443 (1930).
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personal ideology and experience of those holding the office.31 In
response to the formalist model, legal realists developed the
“indeterminacy argument,” which asserts that judicial decisions cannot
be rationally deduced because of conflicting rules within the law and
because of the susceptibility of those rules to conflicting
interpretations.32 Rather than rational deduction, the legal realists
contend that legal decisions are the result of judicial choices regarding
which rules to apply and how to apply them. Those choices are in turn
determined by value judgments and judicial beliefs about the propriety of
certain outcomes.33
Social science studies developing an “attitudinal model” of judicial
behavior lend general credence to the realist view.34 These studies
attempt to establish links between various judicial characteristics and
voting outcomes. Most often studied is the link between voting behavior
and ideology. Studies of this sort typically measure ideology by
reference to the party affiliation of the nominating President,35 although

31. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1995) (“Since the rise of legal realism,
it has been axiomatic that the background and worldview of judges influence cases.”).
32. For a good discussion of the development of the indeterminacy argument, see Hasnas,
supra note 26, at 86–98. Critical legal theorists revived the realist indeterminacy argument in the
1980s. For an example of such a revival, see Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1152–53 (1985) (arguing that application of legal rules is necessarily informed
by both policy considerations and political considerations).
33. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 39 (articulating a similar realist explanation of the
Court).
34. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). The “attitudinal model” moniker is not universally accepted, but it is
prevalent and will be used throughout this Article for the sake of simplicity and clarity. See also
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006).
35. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 51–83 (1983); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 1961–64, 60 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 374, 376–83 (1966); Jon Gottschall, Reagan’s
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70
JUDICATURE 48, 51–54 (1986); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55
AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 843, 845 (1961); Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law:
Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303–07 (discussing the District of Columbia Circuit in particular);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717,
1770–71 (1997) (same); Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 35, 42–43 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991);
Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1955–1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 322–23 (1990); C. Neal Tate, Personal
Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil
Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362–63 (1981).
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studies using other ideological indicators also exist.36 In addition to
ideology, studies have analyzed correlations between voting behavior
and various other judicial characteristics, including geography,37 age,38
gender,39 religion,40 tenure,41 and past experience.42 Most—although
certainly not all—of these studies claim to find positive correlations
between judicial characteristics and voting patterns. And although the
methodology employed has been the source of some debate,43 their
cumulative effect—together with the theoretical work of the legal realists
and their successors—has solidified the notion that judicial
characteristics matter to legal outcomes. In short, even if not accurate,
the attitudinal model of judging has become prevalent, and prevalence is

36. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 818 (1995) (using newspaper editorials to establish ideological
values). Indeed, even Judge Wald has conceded that “subtly or unconsciously, the judge’s political
orientation will affect decisionmaking.” LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS 13 (3d ed. 1994)
(quoting Patricia M. Wald).
37. See, e.g., Songer & Davis, supra note 35.
38. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Effect of Past Judicial Behavior on Subsequent
Decision-Making, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 208, 212 (1979) (finding age a relatively important factor for
Civil Liberties voting).
39. See, e.g., G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985) (arguing that female judges tend to be less
supportive of personal rights claims and minority policy positions than male judges, and tend to
demonstrate greater deference to positions taken by the government); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114
YALE L.J. 1759 (2005). But see Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the
Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 SOC. SCI. J. 77, 86 (1977)
(asserting that female judges behave no differently than their male colleagues in sentencing criminal
defendants).
40. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 38, at 211; Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and
Judicial Decisionmaking, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
41. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1190 (1991); Goldman, supra note 38, at
211.
42. See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 41, at 1189–91 (finding a correlation between
voting in racial equal protection cases and prior prosecutorial experience); Goldman, supra note 38,
at 211.
43. See H.W. Perry, Taking Political Science Seriously, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 889, 891 (2003)
(“Most political scientists . . . would not believe that attitudes are the sole determinant, or that they
play as singular a role as propounded by the so-called ‘attitudinal model.’”). Compare Lee Epstein &
Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002), with Frank Cross, Michael Heise &
Gregory Sisk, Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135 (2002), and
Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 153 (2002).
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good enough to support the claim that litigants might view the identity of
the judge as a relevant factor in the prediction of a case’s outcome.44
If lawyers believe that judicial characteristics affect the decisions of
individual judges, then it is no great stretch to conclude that they might
also believe that the combined characteristics of a panel of judges will
affect collective judicial decisions. That conclusion follows a simple
application of the attitudinal model to three-judge panels, and it has led
some to criticize the current practice of randomly assigning judges to
appellate panels.45 More generally, it has generated concern about the
44. Of particular relevance here is the explicit connection some have made between the
attitudinal model and effective lawyering: because judicial characteristics affect outcomes, those
characteristics (and other external factors that might influence decisions) should be accounted for
and integrated into the lawyer’s decisionmaking process. For example, Hasnas has highlighted the
realists’ claim that lawyers “would be better able to predict the outcome of cases and correctly
advise their clients if they studied the social factors that influence[] judges’ behavior.” Hasnas, supra
note 26, at 89; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 581 (1993) (“Not surprisingly, according to the realist, the ideal lawyer is
the one who is in the best position to counsel his clients about what to expect from litigation. That
lawyer will need to know what leads judges to decide as they do, not what legal reasons, if any,
would
justify
their
decisions. . . . The best explanation of judicial decisions may include the set of binding legal reasons,
but cannot be limited to them. Instead, explanations will point to psychological and sociological
facts about judges as part, if not all, of the causal story.”).
45. Although not required by statute, every circuit of the United States Court of Appeals now
uses some form of random assignment to compose the three-judge panels that hear and decide cases.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 (1994) (describing random assignment as a central characteristic of federal
judicial procedure). For a description of the specific assignment procedures used by the various
circuits, see Brown & Lee, supra note 17.
Random assignment arguably contains an implicit endorsement of judicial formalism because
it assumes that “all judges act with reasonably equivalent motives,” such that random assignment is
neutral with respect to case outcomes. Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for
Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 217 (1999). But if the attitudinal model is
correct, then random assignment will not necessarily guarantee neutrality and a non-random
assignment procedure might be required to achieve neutral panels. For further discussion of
proposals for introducing neutral but non-random assignment procedures, see infra note 118.
Two additional points related to random assignment and neutrality merit brief mention. First,
the practice of random assignment might be defended on grounds other than neutrality. That is, it
may be that courts fully realize that panel composition will affect case outcomes, but that they
nevertheless feel that random assignment is the best way to deal with that fact. However, given the
strong defense of judicial formalism by most judges, it is reasonable to conclude that random
assignment would be defended instead on neutrality grounds. For an enunciation of the contrary
interpretation, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the
Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1066–69 (2000) (“[T]he system can do no more than
ensure that, whatever biases judges bring to the decisionmaking process, they play no role in the
assignment process.”). Second, formalistic ideals are by no means the only rationale for random
assignment. To the contrary, random assignment also serves to “prevent[] judge shopping by any
party, thereby enhancing public confidence in the assignment process,” and to “ensure[] an equitable
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influence of panel composition on case outcomes. As expressed by
Michael Hasday, “[w]inning a case in the U.S. courts of appeals hinges
too much on luck, and not enough on the merits. This system produces
slot machine justice, in which the outcome crucially turns on the three
judges selected to hear the case.”46 Given the numerous attitudinal
studies and their logical implication that the composition of panels is an
important determinant of case outcomes, the prevalence of this concern
is hardly surprising.
Recently a second argument has been developed that provides
additional support for the notion that panel composition affects case
outcomes. Building on insights from the psychology of group
decisionmaking, Richard Revesz, Cass Sunstein, and others have argued
that the interplay of characteristics among the three judges on a panel
affect voting patterns in ways that are different than a simple aggregation
of individual characteristics might suggest.47 For example, both Sunstein
and Revesz have concluded that, at least in certain contexts, the ideology
of other judges on a panel is as good or better a predictor of a judge’s
vote than his or her own ideology,48 and both have concluded that
ideologically uniform panels behave differently than those that are
ideologically diverse.49 There is more to be said about these studies,50
but for present purposes it is enough to note that arguments concerning
“panel dynamics” reinforce the basic notion that predictions as to
outcome can be meaningfully updated and improved if the identity of
judges assigned to reach the outcome is known in advance.
distribution of the case load” among judges of a court. United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61,
61 (D. Mass. 1992).
46. Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 291 (2000). Similarly, Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have argued that partisan imbalances in
panel composition “often lead to case outcomes that reflect partisan interests.” Tiller & Cross, supra
note 45, at 215.
47. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168–72 (1998);
Revesz, supra note 35, at 1759; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 337–46 (2004).
48. Revesz, supra note 35, at 1719 (looking specifically at environmental regulation cases in
the District of Columbia Circuit, and noting that “the party affiliation of the other judges on the
panel has a greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”); Sunstein et al., supra
note 47, at 317; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy:
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006).
49. Sunstein et al., supra note 47, at 343; Tiller & Cross, supra note 45, at 220–21; see also
Cross & Tiller, supra note 47, at 2169–74.
50. See infra notes 109–117 and accompanying text for a further discussion of panel
dynamics.
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It remains to establish a connection between predictive updates
regarding likely outcome and a litigant’s subsequent decision to continue
the appeal or to pursue voluntary dismissal, either through settlement
or—in the case of an appellant—through a unilateral motion to dismiss.
This connection is a natural extension of the longstanding proposition
that decisions regarding litigation and settlement are affected to a great
extent by expectations about outcome. More than twenty years ago,
George Priest and Benjamin Klein argued that “the determinants of
settlement and litigation are solely economic, including the expected
costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information that
parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct
costs of litigation and settlement.”51 Relevant considerations that inform
the likelihood of success at trial should include the “predilections of a
judge” as well as the “application of a legal rule.”52 One primary
contribution of the Priest-Klein model is that it recognizes that settlement
may not occur in cases where the parties have divergent expectations
regarding the outcome.53

51. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1984). Further studies have softened—or at least clarified—the strong Priest-Klein
assertion in certain limited cases where at least one of the parties is motivated by an interest in a
judgment per se. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
434 (2004). In such cases, settlement may not result even if both parties understand that the plaintiff
is very likely to win. This possibility highlights the fact that “the information that parties possess
about the likelihood of success at trial” is not the only relevant factor to litigants, and that the
“expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions” may dominate in some instances. Priest
& Klein, supra, at 4. And they explain why I have hedged a bit by saying that decisions regarding
litigation and settlement are affected to a great extent by expectations about outcome. For a
discussion of how an interest in a judgment per se might limit the effectiveness of early panel
announcement, see infra note 83 and accompanying text.
52. Priest & Klein, supra note 51, at 35.
53. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of
Predictors of Failure To Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 322 (1998) (“Priest and Klein’s
model is based on the ‘divergent expectations’ of the parties; it allows deviation from the basic
model’s assumption that parties’ estimates of the likely outcome at trial are identical.”); Joel
Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation,
41 J. LAW & ECON. 451, 451 (1998) (describing Priest and Klein’s model as one where “cases
proceed to trial when, randomly, the plaintiff is sufficiently more optimistic than the defendant”).
Priest and Klein’s model is the clear theoretical underpinning for the D.C. Circuit procedure.
But that model is not the only “case selection” model in the literature. The most prominent
alternative explanation is based on “asymmetrical information” and stems in large part from work by
Lucian Bebchuk. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information,
15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984). Unlike the divergent expectations model, however, the applicability
of the asymmetric information model in the appellate context may be somewhat restricted because
the potential for asymmetric information is limited in the context of an appeal with a fixed record. A
third model focuses on the external effects of litigation and asymmetries in the stakes between the
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That basic contribution also applies at the appellate level. In most
cases, the economic calculus of the parties should primarily determine
whether an appeal is filed in the first instance.54 But if relevant
information regarding the likelihood of success (or any other economic
factor related to the likely costs or benefits of the appeal) is introduced
only after the inception of the appeal, then the economic calculus will
shift and future decisions related to the ongoing appeal may be affected.
For example, suppose that a decision is made to file an appeal in a
particular case, and that the Supreme Court subsequently issues an
opinion that clarifies one of the issues at stake. In that circumstance, the
parties should be expected to update their predictions regarding the
application of legal rules, and new decisions to settle or dismiss may
result. Because panel composition is perceived to bear a relation to the
likely outcome of the appeal, the introduction of panel composition
information at some point in the appeals process operates in similar
fashion. Once that information is announced, predictions regarding
outcome should be updated, and decisions regarding the desirability of
settlement may be altered.55
In sum, the theory of a settlement effect created by early panel
announcement is one of cue and response. Announcing panel
composition at a relatively early stage provides an informational cue that
litigants will view as relevant to the likely outcome of the appeal.
Rational litigants will respond to that cue by updating their expectations,
which may lead to settlement or voluntary dismissal if the updated
expectations create a zone for mutual agreement and if the cost of
pursuing that agreement is less than the additional costs necessary to
pursue the appeal to completion.

parties. See, e.g., Bruce Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/Settlement
Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 17, 30–40 (David A. Anderson
ed., 1996); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). For
more discussion of these models, and the implications of the D.C. Circuit’s procedure for the
existence of oral argument cases explained by these models, see infra Part IV.C.
54. In fact, according to much of the theoretical literature on the Priest-Klein hypothesis,
decisions to settle after an appeal has been filed are anomalous and occur only in instances of
informational asymmetry. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the
Credibility and Success of Threats To Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1996).
55. For more on the formal economic models underlying settlement decisions in response to
new information introduced during the appeals process, see generally Richard L. Revesz, Litigation
and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on
Ideologically Divided Courts, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2000); or more generally, see Joseph
Grundfest & Peter Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006).
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B. Effect: Intercircuit Comparison and Intracircuit Analysis
To determine whether the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement rule is
producing its intended effect, this section proceeds in two parts. First, I
look at the rate of voluntary dismissal in the D.C. Circuit relative to other
circuits. I find that the D.C. Circuit does not have a higher rate of
voluntary dismissal, and that this is true even when accounting for
differences in subject matter and government involvement in the appeal.
This finding is suggestive, but certainly not determinative. If other
unmeasured factors contribute to general differences in the rates of
voluntary dismissal across circuits, then the apparent lack of an
announcement effect could be misleading.56 To account for that
possibility, I then take a close look at the effect of the panel
announcement procedure in the D.C. Circuit and conclude that the
procedure appears to be at least weakly effective in terms of promoting
settlement activity.
1. Intercircuit comparison of voluntary dismissal activity
The data set for this comparison consists of 600 appeals filed in the
Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits beginning on March
1, 2000. These circuits were selected because they exemplify the panel
announcement variations that are typical across circuits. Regardless of
the internal procedures used for panel composition and case assignment,
most circuits do not announce panel composition to litigants until shortly
before the oral argument is scheduled. The policy of the Second Circuit
is representative in this regard, with panel assignments announced on the
Thursday before the argument.57 The Seventh Circuit is the most
extreme, releasing the panel information on the morning of the
argument.58 In both circuits, the identity of the panel is not known until
after all briefs are filed.
The start date was selected basically at random, although an effort
was made to choose a date sufficiently early that all appeals considered
in the study had reached a final disposition. For each circuit, the data

56. Another way to get a suggestive finding would be to compare voluntary dismissal rates
within the D.C. Circuit before and after adoption of the rule. This approach has the benefit of
eliminating the potential for intercircuit differences in the underlying rates of voluntary dismissal,
but it runs the risk of simply substituting inter-temporal differences.
57. Revesz, supra note 55, at 688.
58. Id.
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consist of the first 200 qualifying appeals filed on or after the start date.59
A qualifying appeal is defined for these purposes as a civil,60 nonadministrative case that is appealed from a federal district court61 and
that does not involve a prisoner.62 In addition, appeals that were
consolidated with other appeals already in the data set were not
separately considered.63
Information from the court docket sheets was used to code the
data.64 Although the docket sheet does not contain any categorization
relating to disposition, it does include the relevant information necessary
59. This means that the last appeal considered in the study was filed on April 14, 2000 in the
Second Circuit, April 26, 2000 in the Seventh Circuit, and September 22, 2000 in the District of
Columbia Circuit.
60. Criminal appeals are not included primarily because the D.C. Circuit’s early
announcement procedure does not apply to those appeals. See HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE, supra note
16, at § II.B.8(a) (“In criminal appeals, unlike most civil appeals, the panel will usually not be
disclosed until after the parties have filed briefs.”). But the exclusion of criminal cases is sensible for
other reasons as well. The traditional settlement calculus, discussed supra Part II.A, does not cleanly
apply to criminal appeals because those cases are not characterized by symmetrical “stakes, cost
savings from settlement, and error characteristics.” See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in
Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right To Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
15 n.49 (1990). Exclusion of criminal appeals should not inhibit the ability of the study to test for an
early announcement effect; if anything, study of civil appeals alone should overestimate the overall
effect of an early announcement procedure on caseload reduction.
61. That is, appeals from bankruptcy and tax courts, as well as those from administrative
agency adjudications, are not considered. Unsurprisingly, this led to the highest percentage of
excluded cases in the D.C. Circuit. These cases were excluded in an effort to maintain some degree
of consistency in the cases, such that reliable comparisons across circuits could be made. Since most
of the literature concerning the Priest-Klein hypothesis centers around its effect on civil actions, the
analysis in this Article is confined to civil appeals.
62. Prisoners generally proceed in forma pauperis, and their appeals—most often in the form
of habeas corpus or mandamus claims—are not susceptible to settlement in the same way as private
civil appeals. In addition, the economic calculus that underlies the Priest-Klein hypothesis does not
apply to prisoner appeals. Because the stakes of the appeal are very high and the costs are very low,
prisoners are not likely to be responsive to changes in information regarding probable outcomes. For
further discussion, see generally Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil
Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989) (exploring factors that affect outcomes in civil
rights and prisoner trials). As with the exclusion of criminal appeals, see supra note 60, the
exclusion of prisoner appeals should lead, if anything, to an overestimation of the overall settlement
effect of an early announcement procedure.
63. Cross-appeals that led to a different disposition from the original appeal were included,
however.
64. Docket sheets are available through the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) system, accessible online at
www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov. Of course, political scientists prefer the use of standardized data sets
rather than individually coded data, and have criticized legal empirical research on that basis. See,
e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 807–12
(2003). Although generally sympathetic to this concern, I am aware of no standardized data source
that includes data of the sort used here.
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to create such a categorization. Therefore, I coded the disposition of each
appeal using the following categorization: Oral Argument (OA), Merits
Decision Without Oral Argument (DWOA), Dismissal by Court (D/C),
and Dismissal by Parties (D/P). Table 1 shows the basic results.65
Table 1: Disposition of Appeals, by Circuit
Second
Circuit

Seventh
Circuit

100 (50.0%)

66 (33.0%)

50
(25.0%)

Merits Decision without
Oral Argument

4
(2.0%)

31
(15.5%)

69
(34.5%)

Dismissal by Court

36
(18.0%)

41
(20.5%)

40
(20.0%)

Dismissal by Parties

60
(30.0%)

62
(31.0%)

41
(20.5%)

Oral Argument

D.C. Circuit

65. One noteworthy finding from Table 1—the disproportionately high percentage of OA
cases in the Second Circuit—merits a brief explanation. With few exceptions, the Second Circuit
hears oral argument in every case that proceeds to the merits stage, and so the DWOA category is
essentially a null category in that circuit. This is an obvious example of how local court practice and
procedure can affect the way that appeals progress. In this case, the Second Circuit’s strong
preference for oral argument means that many appeals proceed to oral argument that would be
decided in other circuits without one. The Second Circuit might justify its preference in two ways.
First, the court may view universal oral argument as a decision-enhancing mechanism. Even in cases
that appear straightforward on the briefs, oral argument may alter the way the panel views the case.
In some small body of cases, it may even result in a change in the direction or the terms of the
court’s ultimate decision. Alternatively, the court may view universal oral argument as a perceptionenhancing mechanism. That is, even if the court feels that the oral argument provides no actual
benefit in terms of the decisions it reaches, it may still prefer them because it is a low-cost way to
attain the valuable benefit of an improved perception of fairness by litigants. This would be true if
litigants view oral argument as an important symbol that the court is taking its case seriously and
considering it carefully. In either case, the rule is in place precisely because the court expects that it
will have some effect on outcome or perception of outcome. There is a final possibility that is
independent of any such anticipated effect. The court may think that the time and resources
necessary to identify cases that would be candidates for decisions without oral argument exceeds the
savings in time and resources that are gained by deciding them in that manner. Given the relative
ease of issuing an order to dispose of a case without oral argument, however, this explanation seems
quite unlikely.
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Total

200
(100.0%)

200
(100.0%)

200
(100.0%)

A logical analytical starting point is a consideration of the overall
rates of voluntary dismissal for each circuit. The D.C. Circuit had a
significantly lower number of cases dismissed by parties than either of
the other two circuits.66 This is unexpected given the theory that early
announcement will encourage parties to settle and therefore voluntarily
dismiss cases. At first glance, then, there is no support for the notion that
the cue and response mechanism is generating its intended effect.
But, of course, other characteristics of the cases included in the data
set may be contributing to differences in the rates of voluntary dismissal.
In an attempt to account for such characteristics, I coded two additional
variables for each case: subject matter and the involvement of a
governmental entity. The docket sheet includes a categorization of the
appeal by subject matter, which I used to create the following general
categories of appeals: Employment and Labor (EL), Other Civil Rights
(OCR),67 Personal Injury (PI), Other Statutory Actions (OS), Contract
(CN), and All Other Appeals (O).68 Involvement of a governmental party
is not generally noted explicitly on the docket sheet.69 Rather, I coded

66. A comparison of the sample frequency of voluntary dismissals for the D.C. Circuit and
the Second Circuit produced a one-sided t-value of 2.2 and a corresponding p-value of .01. A similar
comparison between the D.C. and Seventh Circuit frequencies produced a one-sided t-value of 2.4
and a p-value of .01.
67. This does not include civil rights-based employment claims, which are included instead
in the EL category.
68. “All Other Appeals” includes Securities, Real Property, Intellectual Property, Antitrust,
Environmental, and those characterized by the court as “Other.” The following table shows the
subject matter distribution of cases for each circuit.

Employment & Labor
Other Civil Rights
Contract
Personal Injury
Other Statutory
All Other
Total

Second Circuit
54 (27.0%)
56 (28.0%)
30 (15.0%)
18 (9.0%)
17 (8.5%)
25 (12.5%)
200 (100.0%)

Seventh Circuit
73 (36.5%)
47 (23.5%)
20 (10.0%)
17 (8.5%)
18 (9.0%)
25 (12.5%)
200 (100.0%)

D.C. Circuit
51 (25.5%)
39 (19.5%)
15 (7.5%)
14 (7.0%)
63 (31.5%)
18 (9.0%)
200 (100.0%)

69. The exception to this is the D.C. Circuit practice of giving cases involving the federal
government a docket number series that is distinct (XX-5000) from other civil appeals (XX-7000).
So involvement of the federal government as a party is explicitly categorized by the court, but
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the data by reviewing the listed parties. The inclusion of any
governmental entity on either side of the appeal was sufficient to warrant
affirmative coding on the “Government” variable.70
Subject matter might skew the overall data if the allocation of cases
by subject matter varies across circuits and if the underlying rate of
voluntary dismissal varies across subject matter categories. This latter
requirement seems plausible. For example, appeals involving contracts
might lead to a higher rate of voluntary dismissal than those involving
civil rights.71 Similarly, government party involvement may skew the
data if there are variations in that involvement across circuits and if
underlying voluntary dismissal rates vary according to involvement.
Again, it seems at least plausible that settlement may be more or less
likely based on whether a government party is involved.72
But the voluntary dismissal rate in the D.C. Circuit is not
significantly higher even when accounting for these variables. To get at
this, I ran a binary logistic regression on the 600 cases in the data set,
using voluntary dismissal as the dependent variable and case location,
subject matter, and government involvement as independent variables.

involvement of other governmental entities must still be manually extracted from the XX-7000
appeals.
70. That is, suits involving the federal government as well as the Chicago Police Department
are included as “Government” cases. The following table shows the distribution of the government
involvement variable for each circuit. The following table shows the distribution of the government
involvement variable for each circuit.

Government Party
No Government Party
All Cases

Second Circuit
55 (27.5%)
145 (72.5%)
200 (100.0%)

Seventh Circuit
73 (36.5%)
127 (63.5%)
200 (100.0%)

D.C. Circuit
133 (66.5%)
67 (33.5%)
200 (100.0%)

71. Individuals asserting civil rights claims are often seeking to have a dignitary harm
formally recognized, and may thus be more resistant to a monetary settlement. Individuals suing
based on contract claims are seeking financial redress, and settlement may thus be more agreeable.
But the direction of the effect is unimportant to the point being made here, which is that a subject
matter effect in any direction may skew the results based on all data, given the variations in subject
matter distribution across circuits.
72. As an intuitive matter, the presence of a governmental entity should make settlement less
likely because the governmental entity is more likely to be a repeat player interested in the rule value
of having a judicial decision on the books to guide its future behavior. But the intuition could go the
other way. If the governmental entity is more concerned about the reputational or publicity effects of
an adverse judgment, it may be more willing to settle. As in the case of subject matter effects,
however, the directionality is not the primary concern here. Rather, the existence of an effect in
either direction suggests that the presence of a government party is a variable that should be
controlled in order to get a full understanding of the data.
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The D.C. Circuit was the default location and All Other Cases was the
default subject matter. The regression results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Binary Logistic Regression Results
d
Step1 Seventh
Second
Government
EL
OCR
CN
PI
OS
Constant

B
.543
.452
-.561
-.416
-.770
-.107
.016
.214
-.871

S.E.
.254
.262
.229
.309
.346
.373
.400
.350
.340

Wald
4.553
2.982
5.999
1.810
4.956
.083
.002
.375
6.558

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.033
.084
.014
.179
.026
.774
.968
.540
.010

Exp(B)
1.721
1.571
.570
.660
.463
.898
1.016
1.239
.419

These results do not support the proposition that the D.C. Circuit has
higher rates of voluntary dismissal than either the Second or the Seventh.
Because the regression attempts to control for differences introduced by
subject matter and the involvement of government parties, the circuit
coefficients provide an account of the isolated effect of settlement
differences attributable to the circuits themselves. To support a
hypothesis that similar cases are less likely to settle in the Second or the
Seventh Circuits than in the D.C. Circuit, the coefficients for those other
circuits should be negative and statistically significant. Instead, the
results are just the opposite—both coefficients are positive (.543 for the
Seventh Circuit and .452 for the Second Circuit), and, at least in the case
of the Seventh Circuit, the finding is statistically significant at the .05
level. Based on these results, then, cases outside of the D.C. Circuit
appear more likely to settle, even when controlling for subject matter and
government involvement.
2. A closer look at the D.C. Circuit
A simple comparison of voluntary dismissal rates across these three
circuits fails to support the claim that the D.C. Circuit is generating
higher rates of voluntary dismissal. But that comparison need not compel
the conclusion that the early announcement procedure is without effect.
To begin, case characteristics other than subject matter and government
75
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involvement may be related to settlement, and these characteristics may
be unevenly distributed across circuits. If so, the dismissal rate
differentials may be attributable to that uneven distribution rather than to
an underlying variation in court practice and procedure. Alternatively,
other reasons may explain why voluntary dismissal rates are naturally
lower in the D.C. Circuit relative to the Second and Seventh. For
example, perhaps the D.C. Circuit historically has a much lower rate of
voluntary settlement, and the rule has had the effect of closing the gap. If
so, then a simple comparison of rates across circuits during a single time
period may be inconclusive because a finding that the D.C. Circuit’s rate
of voluntary dismissal is lower than other circuits might still suggest that
the procedure is generating an effect. To account for these possibilities,
this section looks at the D.C. Circuit data in isolation.73 Of two hundred
cases filed, forty-one were voluntarily dismissed by parties—a rate of
20.5 percent. If all of those voluntary dismissals were attributable to the
early announcement rule, then the impact in terms of caseload reduction
would fairly be considered significant. That kind of attribution is surely
problematic, however; it simply cannot be the case that all dismissals are
generated by the rule. Indeed, the pool of cases for which that
explanation is even plausible is substantially smaller. To state the
obvious, early panel announcement is a plausible explanation for
voluntary dismissal only when an announcement has actually been made
prior to dismissal. Of the forty-one voluntarily dismissed cases, only
thirteen satisfy that condition. Relative to the total number of filings, the
rate shrinks from 20.5 percent to 6.5 percent when the numerator is
adjusted to account for this timing condition.
But there might be a denominator problem as well. If the goal is to
assess the extent to which an announcement rule influences litigants, it
does not make sense to include other cases where no panel has been
announced. Instead, the denominator should consist only of cases where
the composition of the panel has been revealed to the parties. Thus, all
cases involving an oral argument should be included along with the
thirteen cases voluntarily dismissed after a panel announcement. Beyond
that, some but not all of the cases that are decided without oral argument
could be included. Appeals decided without oral argument take one of
two forms. In some cases, the court grants a motion for summary
affirmance; this is done by a panel, but there is no advance
73. A different methodological approach that would address this possibility is a differencesin-differences analysis. But such an analysis is complicated here by the difficulty of compiling the
initial time period data.
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announcement of the composition of that panel prior to the issuance of
the court order. Alternatively, the court may notify the parties that no
oral argument is necessary to decide the case. In that situation, the panel
is revealed to the parties at the same time that the order to decide the case
without oral argument is issued. Cases of the latter sort meet the
announcement condition, but I have excluded them for several reasons.
To begin, the early announcement procedure is not technically involved
in those cases because the panel is not revealed in association with an
oral argument scheduling order. More importantly, the panel composition
is disclosed at the same time that another, more powerful informational
cue is revealed. The fact that the court plans to decide the case without
oral argument is a strong indication that a judgment affirming the lower
court’s decision is forthcoming.74 To the extent that any dismissal
activity is generated by a “no oral argument” order, it is likely to be the
result of the substance of the order itself rather than the names of the
judges who issue it.75
If the analysis is narrowed to the cases voluntarily dismissed after an
oral argument order relative to the total number of cases in which an oral
argument order was issued, what remains are thirteen cases potentially
affected by the rule out of sixty-three cases involving a panel
announcement. That represents a maximum rate of 20.6 percent of
announced cases dismissed in response to the rule. To be sure, it is
almost certainly the case that the actual rate is somewhat lower than this
maximum because some cases that settle after panel announcement may
do so for an unrelated reason. There is no way to say more; it is
impossible to disaggregate these cases from those dismissed in direct
response to the panel information. Even so, the existence of these
thirteen cases is at least suggestive. Although not a statistically

74. Of the two hundred D.C. Circuit cases considered, sixty-nine were decided on the merits
without an oral argument. Of that group, thirty-five were decided by summary affirmance and
twenty-four were decided after notifying the parties that no oral argument was required. In every
case of the latter sort, the “no oral argument” announcement was followed relatively shortly by an
affirming judgment.
75. But it is hardly surprising that very little dismissal activity actually occurs. Because the
overwhelmingly typical action after a “no oral argument” order is a judgment without memo
affirming the lower court opinion, the direction and the terms of the court’s forthcoming decision are
essentially known. As a result, the party standing to benefit from the pending judgment would only
accept a settlement on the same terms as the lower court opinion. Both parties might pursue such an
approach were there savings to be recouped that would outweigh the costs of negotiating the
settlement. But of course, at the point that a “no oral argument” order is issued, there are basically no
litigation costs to be saved by dismissing the case because all briefs have been filed, and no
additional resources need be devoted to preparation for oral argument.
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significant measure, perhaps the most that can be said for the procedure’s
effectiveness is that there remains a group of dismissed cases for which
the procedure provides a plausible explanation.
III. BARRIERS TO EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
Despite the presence of a pool of dismissed cases potentially
explained by the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure, its
general impact does not appear overwhelming. This Part explores two
broad explanations for why this might be so. The first is cuing failure,
which occurs when the informational cue being provided may not
actually be valuable to litigants in the way that the court expects. The
second is response failure, which results when litigants either ignore or
misinterpret panel announcement information. Modifications to the
announcement procedure that account for these failures should enhance
the settlement effect. But because the court will almost certainly view
effective modifications as unpalatable, information and litigant failures
create intractable barriers to effectiveness in many cases.
A. Cuing Failure
The D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure will generate new
settlement behavior only if it provides an effective informational cue.
Effective in this context means three things. First, the information
contained in the cue must be strong enough to allow litigants to
significantly update their expectations regarding likely outcome. Second,
the information contained in the cue must be relevant to the litigants’
settlement calculations. Third, the information must be released early
enough to permit cost savings. If any of those conditions does not hold in
a given case, then the information conveyed will not trigger a response
from litigants. This section discusses situations in which panel
announcement represents an ineffective cue and concludes that few
procedural modifications are available to improve the cue’s
effectiveness.
1. Ineffectiveness due to lack of strength
Absent specific panel composition information, litigants should form
a generalized assessment of their prospects based on the overall
composition of the court hearing the appeal. This initial prediction can be
expressed as an expected success calculation of qR × pR + (1 − qR)pD,
where qR is the probability of receiving a majority-Republican panel, and
78
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where pR and pD are the anticipated probabilities of success under
majority-Republican and majority-Democratic panels, respectively.76
After the court announces panel composition, the expected success
calculation collapses to either pR or pD. The amount of updating that
panel announcement permits is thus determined by the gap between qR ×
pR + (1 − qR)pD and pR or pD. Where that gap is small, panel
announcement represents an informational cue with weak content.
Panel composition will often be a weak cue when one ideological
group dominates the court’s overall composition. In this situation, a
litigant’s pre-announcement assessment will be based on an expectation
that the panel will be comprised of a majority from the dominating party.
In most cases, announcement of the actual panel composition will simply
confirm that prediction and will not provide enough additional
information to significantly alter expectations. For example, imagine a
court dominated by Republican judges, such that qR is very high. A
litigant’s pre-announcement expectation in this case closely resembles
pR, and the disclosure of a Republican panel triggers only a slight
modification in expected success. Put differently, panel composition
information leads to greater updating when the expected panel based on
overall court composition is relatively uncertain. As the level of certainty
increases, the value added by announcing panel composition decreases.
As a practical matter, there is little reason to believe that
informational failure of this sort played a significant role in the D.C.
Circuit, at least not during the time period covered by the data. During
that time, the D.C. Circuit was composed of six active judges appointed
by Republican presidents and four active judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. Given that distribution, the probability of getting
a majority-Republican panel—that is, qR—was .67.77 Introduction of
accurate panel composition information in that situation should lead to
significant updating with respect to predicted outcomes that would be
useful to litigants.78 In any event, the court is not in a position to combat

76. See Revesz, supra note 55, at 692.
77. If nR is the number of Republican judges in a ten-judge pool, then the probability of
receiving a majority-Republican panel is given by nR(nR − 1)(14 − nR)/360. Admittedly, this number
is not entirely accurate because senior judges are part of the assignment pool as well, although they
sit with less frequency than active judges.
78. The expected outcome would shift from the pre-announcement expected success
calculation, qR × pR + (1 − qR)pD, to either pR or pD, depending on the panel announced. Since qR is
only .67 here, this shift should be significant in cases where pR and pD are not very close. And where
pR and pD are very close, panel announcement is unlikely to generate much settlement activity for
reasons described later in this section.
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this particular form of informational weakness because it cannot easily
alter its ideological composition.79
Two other forms of informational weakness are more plausible in the
context of the D.C. Circuit. First, panel announcement represents a weak
informational cue when the panel itself is not particularly predictable.
Early announcement is valuable because it clarifies the likely outcome.
But certain panels are likely to be quite unpredictable, and in those cases
the clarification provided by panel announcement is minimal. Second,
panel announcement conveys weak information when litigants do not
perceive the outcome of their appeal to be particularly sensitive to panel
composition. These are cases in which pR and pD are very similar,
meaning that the bold predictions of the attitudinal model are not borne
out in the actual expectations of litigants. The pool of such cases might
be sizable. An overwhelming percentage of appellate decisions are
unanimous, which seems to imply that composition does not matter all
that much in the run of cases.80 If litigants understand the prevalence of
unanimity, their expectations regarding outcome may not be responsive
to panel composition.81 If the appellee and appellant expect outcomes
that are significantly different, then appeals may still be filed. But the
addition of panel announcement information will result in minimal
updating.
If these forms of informational weakness are widespread, the court
might strengthen its cue by encouraging a greater variance between pre79. Of course, judges can contribute to a change in the overall composition of the court by
retiring or by taking senior status, either of which would permit the nomination of a new judge. But
this is obviously a limited and blunt instrument for changing the court’s ideological composition.
Judges might also change their own ideology to create greater ideological diversity. Although
ideological shifts are not unprecedented, it seems far-fetched indeed to imagine that a judge would
consciously choose this course in order to improve the effectiveness of early panel announcement.
80. A focus on unanimous voting may underestimate the actual extent of ideological
disagreement on the court because some portion of unanimous cases reflect “getting along” behavior
by judges who disagree slightly but not enough to expend the effort and the goodwill to register that
disagreement in a formal dissent. See Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom
Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 865–66, 871
(2006).
81. From the litigant’s perspective, the prevalence of unanimity may be a signal that although
the attitudinal model explains some judicial behavior, it does not explain much. What is more,
because it may be difficult for a litigant to predict before the fact which cases will be explained, the
attitudinal model may not be operative in practice as a basis for litigant decisionmaking. Even so, I
am not claiming here that the reality of unanimity requires litigants to reach such a conclusion. Quite
to the contrary, it is almost certainly true that many litigants perceive significant panel distinctions
regardless of reality. My only point is that there may be a body of cases for which litigants do not
perceive panel effects, and for those cases the impact of the panel announcement cue will be
minimal.
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and post-announcement predictions. Producing decisions that are more
predictable and less unanimous should achieve this goal. But aside from
the possibility of disingenuousness, this approach imposes a cost on
judges who would have to write more dissents. The court’s goal of
managing judicial workload would thus be undermined. Another
alternative is to convince litigants through less costly means that panel
composition actually matters in most cases. But for reasons discussed
shortly, such efforts are unlikely.82
2. Ineffectiveness due to lack of relevance
In the paradigmatic case, a plaintiff seeks something from the
defendant that the defendant could provide but would prefer not to.
Money is a fitting example, although demands such as promotions in
employment cases or admission to school in affirmative action cases also
fit. Ultimately, settlement is plausible because both parties have an
interest in minimizing costs and because the plaintiff does not
particularly care whether the thing sought is provided by agreement or by
court order. But some cases are different. Consider, for example, a
plaintiff who wants a judgment officially entered against a defendant to
satisfy a desire to have wrongdoing publicly and officially
acknowledged. The key difference here is that the defendant is not in a
position to readily provide that which the plaintiff seeks. The plaintiff is
not interested in something that can be awarded by judgment, but is
instead interested in a judgment per se. Settlement may not be possible in
such cases even if both parties agree on the likely outcome and even if
significant costs can be saved.83 As a result, the disclosure of panel
information will produce no effect—even if it clarifies the likely
outcome—because it is not relevant to the litigant’s decisions. As with
weak cues, the court cannot easily remedy an irrelevant cue because
nothing short of a judgment will satisfy the parties.

82. For a fuller discussion of the court’s almost certain hesitance to embrace an active role in
promoting the attitudinal model of judging, see infra text accompanying notes 90–92.
83. To be clear, I am not making a general claim here about cases involving non-monetary
remedies. In many such cases a plaintiff will readily accept money instead of the non-monetary
remedy being sought. Rather, the point is that some litigants may be hesitant to do so, and that an
interest in a judgment per se can make settlement less likely. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 51,
at 434.
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3. Ineffectiveness due to insufficient cost savings
A final possibility is that panel announcement has limited effect due
to the timing of its release. Even though announcement in the D.C.
Circuit comes very early in relative terms, it still may not come early
enough in the process to make significant cost savings available. As
Richard Revesz has pointed out, if the ratio of pre-announcement
litigation costs to total litigation costs is sufficiently high, then
“announcing the panel before all the litigation costs have been expended
is equivalent to announcing it after all such costs have been expended.”84
The question then is whether the announcement comes early enough to
offer the prospect of cost savings that will outweigh the costs of
negotiating the settlement. The D.C. Circuit’s procedure generally
reveals panel composition before briefing is completed, and in these
instances appreciable cost savings should be available. But occasionally
the announcement is made after briefs have been filed, and in those cases
the available cost savings may be quite low, consisting primarily of the
costs of preparing for and conducting oral argument.
To improve the impact of the panel composition cue, the court could
move the announcement to an earlier stage of the appeals process. This
would increase the savings that post-announcement settlement provides.
At a minimum, the court should ensure that announcement always
precedes the completion of briefing. Other more dramatic options include
announcing panel composition at the time that a notice of appeal is filed
or even at the time that a lower court reaches a final judgment. Although
these latter approaches would maximize available cost savings, they have
the potential to backfire. Very early release of panel composition
presents an opportunity for prospective appellants to obtain valuable
information about likely outcome at a very low price, and that may draw
parties into the appeals process who would otherwise steer clear.85 Put
84. See Revesz, supra note 55, at 697. In cases where relatively few costs would be saved by
pursuing a settlement, a party may decide to carry out an appeal notwithstanding the announcement
of an unfavorable panel. That decision could result because the cost of conducting the settlement
negotiations is equal to or greater than the cost of completing the appeal, or because the party makes
a calculated decision to pay the relatively minimal additional fees to carry out the appeal to purchase
an option on the possibility that the appeal will defy prediction.
85. See id. at 696–97. Indeed, Revesz suggests that as a theoretical matter this effect should
already be occurring. Id. at 709 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit practice induces the litigation of cases that
would not be pursued at all under the majority practice.”). But it is difficult to assess whether theory
has been translated into practice based on the data discussed in Part II.B because there is no reliable
way to discern whether a given appeal would have been filed in the absence of the announcement
regime.
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differently, early announcement produces two countervailing effects.
Many cases that would appeal regardless of the announcement procedure
may settle after the panel is announced, reducing the number of cases
that the court must decide. But some cases that are appealed precisely
because of the announcement procedure may not settle after the panel is
announced, thereby increasing the number of cases. If the latter group is
larger than the former, the move toward earlier announcement will
ultimately make the judges’ adjudicative burden worse rather than
better.86
B. Response Failure
The previous section discusses conditions in which the court’s
informational cue may fail to alter litigant behavior because the cue itself
is ineffective. This section addresses conditions under which settlement
activity may fail to occur even where the cue qualifies as effective in the
abstract. The conventional model of settlement behavior discussed in
Part II.A assumes that both sides of a dispute treat information
rationally.87 When new information is introduced, both sides are
expected to process it accurately and integrate it into an updated outcome
prediction. But the assumption of rational behavior that pervades
economic models of litigant behavior has been the subject of steady
attack over the past twenty years. If the rationality assumption does not
hold, then the introduction of new information may not contribute to
increased settlement activity.
Three things must occur for a litigant to rationally process the
informational cue that the D.C. Circuit provides. The litigant must first

86. As noted by Revesz, there is no way to predict theoretically which group of cases will be
larger. See id. at 708. Also, it is important here to distinguish between the burden on the judges in
particular and the burden on the court more generally. Even if earlier announcement leads to fewer
cases that proceed to merits panels, the shift to earlier announcement might still increase the burden
on the court due to the increased number of appeals filed in response to the cheap availability of
relevant information. But increasing the overall burden on the court while reducing the burden on
judges might be a sensible tradeoff, given that it is relatively easier (and less expensive) to modify
non-judge staffing levels.
Ultimately, I am not as concerned with the particulars of the relative magnitudes of these
effects as I am with discerning whether the cue and response model produces effects at all. If Revesz
is right, then the early announcement procedure may have the effect of increasing the number of
appeals filed. But there still should be settlement activity generated, and that settlement activity will
be influenced by the barriers discussed here and will create distortions of the sort discussed in Part
IV.
87. See Priest & Klein, supra note 51, at 4 (“The most important assumption of the model is
that potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision.”).
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notice that a cue has been provided, then recognize that the cue contains
relevant information, and finally integrate that information accurately to
form a new prediction of likely outcome. Errors that occur in the first
two steps can sensibly be grouped together, and I will refer to both as
ignorance errors. Litigants who make ignorance errors do not respond to
the informational cue, either because they do not notice it or because
they wrongly consider it beside the point.88 In contrast, errors that occur
at the final step arise because parties attempt to respond to the
informational cue but make mistakes when doing so. Missteps made
while processing new information are common, and here they may
inhibit the cue’s effectiveness by contributing to skewed interpretations
of its impact on likely outcome.
1. Ignorance errors
Ignorance errors result when a party does not notice that a cue has
been provided or when the party notices the cue but fails to recognize
that it contains relevant information. The manner in which the court’s
informational cue is conveyed contributes to the existence of ignorance
errors. Three general models are possible, which I will refer to as models
of availability, disclosure, and publicity. In an availability model, the
court makes information available but leaves it up to the parties to
acquire the information. In a disclosure model, the court makes the
information available and takes the additional step of affirmatively
providing that information to the litigants. In a publicity model, the court
not only discloses the information to the parties but also emphasizes its
importance and relevance.
As an intuitive matter, ignorance errors presumably decrease as the
court becomes more active in transmitting the informational cue. A
relatively attentive and engaged litigant who constantly and rationally
updates expectations regarding likely outcomes may nevertheless miss a
cue if it is only available upon inquiry. This is particularly true if the
litigant is unfamiliar with the peculiarities of a court’s practice and
procedure and therefore unaware that a source of potentially relevant

88. In some cases, it may be true that the composition of the panel is unrelated to the
outcome of the appeal, as in cases clearly governed by a binding Supreme Court precedent. If parties
in those cases fail to update their outcome predictions in response to panel announcement, they
should not be considered irrational (although some other source of irrational behavior might explain
why an appeal was filed at all in those circumstances). Instead, the irrational moniker applies only in
those cases where updating would be possible, but is not even attempted because of a failure to
recognize the informational cue provided by the panel announcement.
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information exists. Disclosure in these cases would remedy ignorance
errors. Similarly, publicity may cure ignorance errors if there is a class of
litigants who would update predictions in response to relevant
information but who fail to recognize the relevance of a given piece of
information.
The D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure is an example of a
disclosure-style cue. The cue is conveyed by including the names of the
judges who will compose the panel in the order scheduling oral
argument. Because the parties receive that order directly, the cue is
affirmatively presented rather than simply made available. But because
the court does not highlight the information or explain its potential
importance, litigants themselves must draw appropriate conclusions from
the disclosure.
An obvious way for the D.C. Circuit to improve the procedure’s
effectiveness is to shift from a disclosure model toward a publicity
model. This shift might take various forms. The most subtle change
would disclose the information in an isolated order. When many pieces
of information are conveyed at once, there is an increased likelihood that
some of the information will be overlooked or misunderstood by the
recipient.89 Here, litigants may focus on other information conveyed in
the oral argument order, such as the date of the argument or the time
allocated to each side, and thus may fail to take proper notice of panel
composition. Conveying composition in an isolated order should
therefore improve the likelihood that litigants will detect the cue and
consider its potential relevance. This shift is attractive because it costs
very little and because judges are unlikely to view it as objectionable on
other grounds. Realistically, however, the class of litigants who would
notice and respond to panel composition when conveyed in isolation but
who fail to do so when conveyed along with other information is almost
certainly quite small. For that reason, isolated disclosure ultimately looks
like a modification that is agreeable but without much bite.
To have more bite, the shift toward publicity needs to be more
drastic. One possibility is to accompany disclosure of panel composition
information with a court notice indicating that litigants may find the
disclosure useful in settlement negotiations. A second possibility is
disclosure accompanied by a detailed report of how the assigned panel
89. For discussions of this phenomenon in other contexts, see Richard Craswell, Taking
Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92
VA. L. REV. 565, 581–86 (2006); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and
Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 441–44 (2003).
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has voted in past cases. Either of these options would take the court
firmly into the territory of a publicity model and would improve the
extent to which litigants notice the composition information and
recognize its importance. Indeed, either of the approaches just discussed
should virtually eliminate existing ignorance errors.
Even so, the D.C. Circuit is unlikely to embrace such alternatives
because they are unattractive for other reasons. As discussed in Part II.A,
judges are generally careful to publicly adopt formalist stances and to
resist any admission that judicial characteristics affect judicial decisions.
In the context of the federal courts of appeals, there are at least two
reasons to explain that behavior. First, judges may think that a public
embrace of the formalist view is necessary to ensure the acceptance and
legitimacy of the independent judiciary. Along these lines, Judge Wald
has emphasized that “[f]or our citizens to have confidence in the courts’
decisions, they must be convinced that judges are impartial as to
litigants, including the state, and that we are not embarked on personal
ideological crusades.”90 A second reason is unique to the appellate
context. Appeals courts alone in the federal system must support a fiction
of a unified court composed of judges who decide individual cases in
randomly assigned panels.91 Intuitively, that distinction seems a likely
source of pressure to keep up appearances of formality because
acknowledgments of attitudinal effects can destabilize the fiction of the
unified court.
Indeed, even Judge Edwards’s support for the early announcement
procedure is hedged by a simultaneous desire to maintain a formalist
posture. Rather than arguing that early announcement should promote
settlement because it will actually provide useful information to litigants,
Judge Edwards bases his support on a claim that litigants will mistakenly
perceive that the information is useful.92 By crafting the argument in this
way, Judge Edwards can support both the early announcement procedure

90. Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173, 182
(1992).
91. The district courts lack the characteristic of a unified court because they are not bound by
decisions reached by other judges in the same court. The Supreme Court lacks the characteristic of
permutation because it is composed of a single panel that hears all cases. Having said that, the
Supreme Court confronts this difficulty to some extent because the composition of its single panel
changes over time. But the passage of time itself provides a natural alternative explanation for the
Court to explain different outcomes that are reached in similar cases without having to acknowledge
that differences in Court composition may be at least equally influential.
92. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (referring to a “false image” as the basis for the
procedure’s effect).
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and the formalist model of judging. But this argument makes sense only
if the court limits its role to the disclosure of the panel announcement
cue. If the court instead becomes actively involved in instructing litigants
about the cue’s potential relevance, a simultaneous defense of judicial
formalism appears impossibly strained. In short, the court is likely to
view a meaningful move toward publicity as an acknowledgment that the
attitudinal model has merit. Such an admission would almost certainly
constitute an unacceptable price to pay to improve the operation of the
early announcement procedure regardless of its potential effect.
2. Perception errors
Perception errors result when litigants notice the informational cue
and respond to it, but make mistakes when doing so. As an example,
numerous studies demonstrate that individuals have a “persistent
tendency to integrate new information in a self-serving fashion.”93 As a
result of this confirmatory or self-serving bias, the disclosure of identical
information may not lead to updated predictions in different directions.
Law students, for instance, interpret factual information related
differently if they are assigned a hypothetical side to represent before the
information is disclosed.94 Under the traditional law-and-economics
theory, appeals are filed when there is a difference between the appellant
and appellee regarding likely outcome.95 The theory underlying the D.C.
Circuit procedure is that disclosure of panel composition information
may close that gap and thus make settlement between the two parties
possible in some cases. But if the self-serving bias affects integration of

93. Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1285 (2002). For a more general discussion of the self-serving bias, see,
for example, Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV.
1337, 1342 (1995); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000); George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135, 157–59 (1993). For psychological studies detailing the “self-serving bias,” see Dale
Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
94. Babcock et al., supra note 93, at 1342; Loewenstein et al., supra note 93, at 151–52.
95. See Priest & Klein, supra note 51, at 12–13; see also Robert D. Cooter & Daniel
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 273 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1067 (1989).
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panel information, then the gap between the parties may be unchanged
and may even expand after the court provides an informational cue.96
As with ignorance errors, the most obvious way for the court to
address these errors is to move toward publicity. Again, the court might
accompany the disclosure of panel composition information with a
detailed analysis of what the information might imply. That analysis
might itself be subject to a self-serving bias, but the potential for that bias
should decrease when the space to interpret new information in varying
ways shrinks. In other words, if the implications of new information are
made explicit when disclosed, litigants are less able to create an
interpretation that simply confirms pre-existing preferences. Instead, the
greater risk would be that litigants may fall victim to an overconfidence
bias that would lead them to believe that their case is an outlier.97 A
different approach that may avoid these problems is to couple disclosure
of panel composition information with a required settlement conference.
This requirement would contribute to a more objective interpretation of
the information because it would force litigants to confront alternative
interpretations of the information that they might otherwise neglect.98
In either case, the court is again thrust into a position of combating
errors by adopting a more active role in the dissemination of its
informational cue. This highlights a general difficulty. Because a
publicity model provides the greatest opportunity for the court to control
how litigants interpret and respond to its cue, it is the optimal approach
for minimizing perception errors, however they arise. At the same time,
for reasons previously explained, a move toward a publicity model is not
viable because it requires a level of intervention beyond that which the
court will accept. In short, the court is almost certainly unwilling to move
beyond a disclosure model, and that unwillingness means that the court
must leave the interpretation of the cue almost entirely in the hands of
litigants—and must accept perception errors when they occur.
The D.C. Circuit might address both ignorance and perception errors
by changing the way it conveys panel announcement information. But
significant movement from the status quo toward a publicity model is

96. See Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 1285 (“Rather than bringing parties together, mutually
shared common information can provide a fertile environment for disagreement and inefficient
impasses.”).
97. For a discussion of the overconfidence bias, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 93, at
1091–93.
98. See id. at 1094 (suggesting that the self-serving bias “provides support for legal structures
that require litigating parties to view the facts of a dispute through the eyes of their opponents”).
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unlikely. A slight move in the form of isolated disclosure would be
potentially acceptable but ineffective. Any greater move is in tension
with the court’s interest in maintaining a perception of panel neutrality,
and is therefore likely to be viewed as unacceptable even if potentially
effective. Accordingly, existing ignorance and perception errors are an
intractable hindrance to the success of an early announcement procedure,
at least in terms of settlement promotion. The implications for that
intractability are taken up in Part IV.
IV. DISTORTIONS CREATED BY EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT
The preceding discussion suggests various barriers that impede the
effectiveness of the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement cue and
concludes that procedural modifications to address those barriers are
likely to be either ineffective or unacceptable. This Part examines how
those barriers might affect the procedure’s operation in practice. In
particular, it describes and evaluates three ways that the procedure
distorts the body of cases reaching oral argument. While none of these
distortions is likely to be dramatic or extreme, each may have marginal
effects on the content of cases that proceed to a merits decision and on
the way that those cases are presented to and decided by their assigned
panels.
A. The Predictability Distortion
If early announcement works at all, it works best and most often in
cases where the cue is strong, that is, where the panel announcement
gives litigants a strong indication of the likely outcome. Predictability
distortions exist because the strength of panel information is not uniform
and varies based on the predictability of the judges and the predictability
of the legal issues involved. Because of these irregularities, the procedure
affects the types of cases that proceed to oral argument and the
composition of the panels who hear them. In particular, early
announcement maximizes the creation and revision of settlement zones
when litigants perceive the announced panel to be particularly
predictable. Conversely, settlement is less likely when the announced
panel is perceived to be unpredictable. As a result, an early
announcement procedure should be expected to increase the extent to
which oral argument cases involve unpredictable panels.99
99. To be a bit more precise, what should really be expected is that oral argument cases
should involve relatively more panels that are perceived by litigants to be unpredictable. A
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Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge have articulated precisely this
expectation. After analyzing voting patterns and approaches to claim
construction in the Federal Circuit, Wagner and Petherbridge first
conclude that although many members of the court are predictable, about
half do not have “predictable effects on outcomes when empanelled.”100
Based on this predictability divide, they then predict that an early
announcement procedure would result in a “larger proportion of opinions
being decided by panels (and written by judges) that are less
predictable.” 101 And because they believe that this by-product of the
procedure “could have long-term negative effects on the overall
performance of the court,” they ultimately caution against its
adoption.102
Wagner and Petherbridge do not provide an account for their
jurisprudential concern, instead asserting the “long-term negative
effects” as something of a given. But it is easy to imagine such effects in
the extreme case. If the effect of the procedure is very dramatic, the court
will appear to be pre-announcing results in many cases when it
announces panels. This is efficient, perhaps,103 but unsatisfactory in light

difference between composition in the voluntary dismissal cases and oral argument cases would
support the concept of a predictability distortion. In particular, a finding that voluntary dismissal
cases involve relatively more predictable panels than oral argument cases would suggest the
existence of a predictability distortion in practice. Along those lines, consider again the data
discussed in Part II.B. The following table shows the panel composition of D.C. Circuit cases
dismissed by party and those proceeding to oral argument, as well as the expected distribution given
the overall court composition.

RRR
RRD
RDD
DDD
Total

Dismissed by Party
2 (15.4%)
6 (46.2%)
5 (38.5%)
1 (7.7%)
13 (99.9%)

Oral Argument
5 (10.2%)
25 (51.0%)
13 (26.5%)
6 (12.2%)
49 (100.0%)

Expected
16.7%
50.0%
30.0%
3.3%
100.0%

Obviously, the sample size is too small to provide statistically significant results; a larger scale study
might provide a better sense of the existence and practical effect of a predictability distortion.
100. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 20, at 1175.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. This state of affairs may not even be efficient if the possibility of low-cost “preannouncement” draws a high volume of new appeals into the system. See supra notes 85–86 and
accompanying text.
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of the two traditional aims of a judicial system: dispute resolution and
case law production.104 To begin, when the court resolves disputes by
pre-announcing results, there is no case law created to guide behavior
and reduce the need for future resort to the legal system. More
importantly, the manner of resolving disputes is itself problematic
because litigants will view it as random and unfair. Although fairness has
been viewed as “of secondary importance” relative to the need for the
system to guarantee resolution that is peaceful,105 perceptions of
unfairness can be devastating because litigants are less likely to submit to
an unfair system voluntarily.106 Over time, the procedure threatens to
cultivate a perception of illegitimacy because litigants are deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the dispute resolution
process.107

104. Virtually every theory of adjudication recognizes that a judicial system must serve these
two general goals, which Chad Oldfather has recently referred to as “points of fundamental
agreement” in contemporary discussions of adjudication and adjudicative duty. Chad M. Oldfather,
Defining Judicial Inactivism, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 137–38 (2005). First, a judicial system must provide
an outlet for dispute resolution. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 937, 937–38 (1975). The judicial system can act only when presented with a dispute,
and as a result, resolution of disputes is in many ways a court’s archetypal function. I will refer to
this function as the court’s “dispute resolution function.” But of course that is not all that a judicial
system does, nor all that we expect it to do. Instead, courts—and particularly appellate courts—issue
opinions not only to formalize the resolution of the dispute (and perhaps to legitimize that resolution
by convincing the litigants that their participation was regarded, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978)), but also to establish legal rules that will
shape and govern the behavior of parties not privy to the specific dispute being resolved. See
Oldfather, supra at 137–38. I will refer to this second aim as the court’s “case law production
function.” Disagreement—sometimes fierce disagreement—exists as to the relative importance of
these two functions, but the dual nature of adjudication is not in much dispute. See, e.g., Meir DanCohen, Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–7
(1985).
105. See Scott, supra note 104, at 937 (“[I]t is more important for society that the dispute be
settled peaceably than that it be settled in any particular way.”).
106. See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND.
L.J. 301, 304 (1989) (noting that a system that resolves disputes in an arbitrary way would not be
perceived as fair, and that “[c]itizens would not voluntarily submit to such a system”). To be sure,
the resolution of disputes here is not quite as random as the proverbial coin flip because the outcome
does bear some relationship to the overall composition of the court, which might in turn be related to
some notion of public representation. Even so, the resolution is random enough to raise unfairness
concerns.
107. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 277–81 (2004). To be
sure, formal participatory rights exist here, and we might not credit claims of illegitimacy from those
who have opted not to exercise them. At the same time, there is cause for concern if the reason that
litigants are opting out is that they perceive no possibility that their input will influence the court’s
decision.
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For the reasons discussed in Part III, however, this concern is
unrealistic because the procedure will almost certainly never produce an
extreme effect. And indeed these kinds of extreme difficulties do not
appear to be what Wagner and Petherbridge are getting at when they
decry the increased influence of unpredictable judges and panels.
Instead, their claim seems subtler. Predictability is commonly viewed as
one of the “essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of
law.”108 If the early announcement procedure increases the number of
cases decided by unpredictable panels and judges, we might expect the
level of unpredictability in the case law to rise as well. In other words,
the claim is that the announcement procedure would ultimately threaten
the stability and coherence of the case law, which outweighs any possible
benefit the procedure might have in terms of caseload reduction.
Despite the intuitive appeal of that account, there is reason to
question its legitimacy. Consider again the “panel effects” studies by
Revesz, Sunstein, and others discussed in Part II, and particularly the
impact of “group polarization.”109 Group polarization describes the
process by which groups of like-minded individuals reinforce and
amplify each other’s judgments. When this occurs, the result of
deliberation is that “groups end up adopting a more extreme version of
their predeliberation tendencies.”110 Applied to the context of appellate
decisionmaking, group polarization may help to explain why panels
consisting exclusively of members of one ideological group vote in ways
that are more extreme than those containing an ideological mix. If no
panel effects existed, we would expect no difference in outcomes
between one panel composed of three predictable conservatives and
another composed of two predictable conservatives and either a
predictable liberal or an unpredictable. In both cases, the two predictable
conservatives should outvote the remaining member, thereby making that
third member irrelevant. But as an empirical matter, that third member
108. Larry D. Thompson Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent
Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 589 (2004) (citing
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 1981)); see also Henry J. Friendly,
Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
109. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
110. Sunstein et al., supra note 47, at 340. Three primary explanations for the group
polarization phenomenon have been suggested: (1) people inclined to a position will have that
position reinforced and head in a more extreme direction when all members of the group share a
similar initial position; (2) members of a group seek the approval of the other members and will air
their opinion in a way favorable to the other members of the group; and (3) the similarity of
viewpoints in a group lends confidence to an individual member’s ideas and therefore enables a
more confident assertion of extreme ideas. Id. at 341–43.
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seems to matter after all, as ideologically split panels vote differently
than ideologically uniform ones.
The impact of ideological amplification is not limited to voting.
Although extremely difficult to measure, the suspicion is that the content
of written judicial opinions may be affected by ideological amplification
as well.111 Along those lines, Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have
suggested that the presence of a non-uniform viewpoint can significantly
affect the terms of an opinion, even if that viewpoint is not expressed in
the form of a formal dissent.112 Part of the explanation for that may be
that the writing judge responds to the threat of a dissent and consciously
moderates the opinion from a more extreme form in order to achieve
unanimity. Yet even more plausible is that no conscious moderation
occurs; instead, the opinion is less extreme because the presence of
ideological diversity naturally moderates the decisionmaking of the
drafter. In either case, the end result is that ideological amplification may
impact the performance of a panel’s dispute resolution function (by
affecting the direction in which a dispute is decided) as well as its case
law production function (by affecting the terms of the opinion expressing
that decision).
The possibility of group polarization and ideological amplification
forms the basis for Cass Sunstein’s recent arguments in favor of
ideological diversity on panels.113 Panels composed of judges
representing varying viewpoints are more likely to identify the correct
outcome in cases where one outcome is clearly preferable, and are more
likely to reach a moderate outcome in cases where no clearly preferable
outcome exists. In cases where there is a clearly correct outcome,
“diversity on a three-judge panel is likely to bring that fact to light and to
move the panel’s decision in the direction of what the law actually
requires. The existence of politically diverse judges, and of a potential
dissenter-whistleblower, increases the chance that the law will be
followed.”114 In cases where the correct outcome is less clear, we might
also benefit from ideological diversity, either because “through that
route, more reasonable opinions are likely to be heard,”115 or because the

111. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 47, at 2156–57; see also Sunstein et al., supra note 47, at
304.
112. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 47, at 2174.
113. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Sunstein et al., supra
note 47, at 353.
114. SUNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 185; see also Cross & Tiller, supra note 47, at 2172.
115. SUNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 186.
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varying viewpoints will have a “moderating effect” that is desirable in
cases of genuine uncertainty.116 In short, diversity of viewpoints
improves the accuracy and consistency of the court’s decisionmaking
when viewed as a whole.
But even if ideological diversity on panels is considered desirable in
theory, it is difficult to guarantee in practice. The fundamental problem is
that a project of creating ideologically diverse panels is in direct tension
with the current practice of random assignment.117 Although serious
proposals have been suggested that deviate from random assignment in
the pursuit of ideological diversity,118 garnering support for those

116. Id. (“[I]f we are genuinely uncertain about what judges should do, we have reason to
favor a mix of views merely by virtue of its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty, sensible
people choose between the poles.”).
117. As an alternative solution to systematic deviation from random assignment, Sunstein has
suggested that the Senate step up its “advice and consent” role in an effort to promote diversity in the
federal judiciary. Id. at 189–90. In the current climate, this seems politically implausible. But
plausibility aside, Sunstein’s suggestion remains unsatisfactory at the level of the appellate courts
because an ideologically diverse pool of appellate judges can still generate ideologically uniform
panels (although it is true that a diverse pool is less likely to do so). In short, imposition of
ideological diversity at the nomination and confirmation stage is best suited for the Supreme Court,
where the pool and the panel are identical.
118. Two possibilities have been suggested. Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have proposed an
assignment procedure that explicitly takes account of judicial ideology in an effort to create balanced
panels. Tiller & Cross, supra note 45. The authors note that in 1992 the chance of getting a
politically split panel by random assignment was only 58 percent. Id. at 227. The probability of
getting a three-Republican panel was 41 percent, while the probability of getting a three-Democrat
panel was only about 1 percent. Furthermore, they cite recent studies indicating that ideological
voting is especially pronounced in cases where the “circuit court panel is unified with like-minded
partisans (3-0 panels of Democratic or Republican appointees).” Id. at 215 (citing Cross & Tiller,
supra note 47, at 2168–72). To counteract these effects, they suggest a method for selection that
would guarantee at least one member from each party on every appellate panel. This method entails
selecting one judge from each political party—again, as measured by the party of the nominating
President—and then choosing a third judge from all of the remaining judges. “The result would be
all split panels, with the ratio of majority party panels dependent on the ratio within the circuit as a
whole.” Id. at 233. For a criticism of this proposal, see Wald, supra note 28.
Alternatively, Michael Hasday has suggested a complex assignment system based on the
expressed preferences of the litigants. Hasday, supra note 46, at 291. That proposal avoids an
explicit recognition that the politics of judges matter but might still lead to panel assignments that
are more neutral than random assignment. In her criticism of the Tiller & Cross proposal, Judge
Wald expressed concern that the explicit acknowledgment of a politicized judiciary would “change[]
radically the public’s and the judge’s own perception of her role.” Wald, supra note 28, at 254–55.
By contrast, Hasday’s approach attempts to “avoid[] any explicit mixing of politics with the
judiciary.” Hasday, supra note 46, at 306.
Technically, the goal of these proposals is to achieve neutral panels rather than ideologically
diverse ones. But the two goals would almost certainly overlap. In the Tiller and Cross proposal, the
overlap is explicit, at least to the extent that ideological diversity is achieved by composing panels of
judges from both parties. See Tiller & Cross, supra note 45. In the Hasday proposal, the overlap is
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proposals is difficult because they require the court itself to play an
active part in addressing the problematic influence of attitudinal
effects.119
The distortion created by non-uniform panel predictability may offer
a roundabout solution. Because the announcement of less predictable
panels is less likely to lead to settlement, and because those less
predictable panels are more likely to be ideologically diverse, the
procedure
should
encourage
ideological
diversity
on
panels that ultimately decide cases and write opinions.120 And it should
do so without requiring excessive active participation by the
court.121 If so, the concern expressed by Wagner and Petherbridge is
misplaced. In short, the distortion created by non-uniform panel
predictability may ultimately provide a jurisprudential benefit in the form
of opinions that are more accurate, more restrained, and more
consistent from the perspective of the court as a whole.122
not explicit but is very likely. By responding to litigant preferences, which, if rational and accurate,
should be as ideologically opposed as possible, the proposal should promote ideological diversity.
See Hasday, supra note 46.
119. The Tiller and Cross proposal requires the most explicit acknowledgment, and that aspect
of the proposal was an important basis for Judge Wald’s criticism. See Wald, supra note 28. Given
the strong judicial defense of formalism and neutrality, see supra text accompanying note 29, other
judges are likely to react similarly. The Hasday proposal is perhaps less problematic in this regard
because it consciously avoids explicit recognition of ideological effects through the mechanism of
“matching” panels based on expressed party preferences. See Hasday, supra note 46. Even so, the
proposal must be administered by the court, and the basis (or at least the likely perceived basis) for
using its complex assignment mechanism rather than random assignment would be to address
ideological effects.
120. Again, the actual effect stems from perceived diversity rather than actual diversity. See
supra note 99.
121. Obviously the court is still required to participate in the form of announcing the panel
composition. But this level of participation is not likely to be considered as problematic, perhaps
because the court can plausibly claim to be providing the information for unrelated reasons, e.g.,
Edwards, supra note 18 (offering an explanation rooted in the convenience of the parties), or perhaps
because the court is not altering its assignment practices in response to attitudinal effects.
122. Richard Revesz has suggested yet another possibility: in some cases, announcement of a
very predictable panel may not lead to greater settlement activity at all. Instead, the favored party
may opt to pursue the appeal and make more extreme arguments in the hope of getting a particularly
favorable opinion that will be useful in future cases. See Revesz, supra note 55, at 700–01. This
would imply that the expectation of a predictability-based distortion is misguided. But this response
is more likely where the favored party is a repeat player with an interest in the rule value created by
an appeal. A one-time player interested only in the judgment would maximize utility by pursuing
settlement. In other words, Revesz’s insight really captures differences in the way litigants will
respond to panel announcement based on their ultimate interest in the appeal. For more on this, see
infra Part IV.C.
At least two other effects created by the predictability distortion are possible. First, the
distortion can mislead potential litigants. When cases settle in response to the announcement of a
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B. The Sophistication Distortion
A second distortion is created by the existence of ignorance and
perception errors,123 and more specifically by the fact that those errors
are not likely to be evenly distributed across litigants. Instead, certain
“sophisticated” litigants will manage to avoid informational processing
errors, thereby permitting themselves to make use of the cue more
accurately and more often. Other “unsophisticated” litigants will be
particularly prone to those errors and will thus be able to use the
informational cue in limited cases or not at all. Defined this way, the
early announcement procedure should select sophisticated litigants out of

predictable panel, the panel’s vote on the legal issues represented by the appeal is effectively not
recorded. In essence, the panel performs its conflict resolution function without getting a chance to
perform its case law production function. The effect is similar to a panel choosing to file a short
nonprecedential opinion to dispatch an appeal on the merits, but the difference is that the panel here
does not control the choice. And while this is always true of panels assigned to hear appeals that
settle prior to a merits decision, in most cases it is safe to assume that there is no systematic effect
created because the settlement activity is not responsive to the panel itself. Here, the situation is
quite different. Decisions are not being entered precisely because of the panel composition, and the
distribution of those excluded panels is not random. This is potentially misleading because parties
might reasonably consult the recorded decisions of the court either to determine whether to file an
appeal or to guide their behavior in the hopes of avoiding the litigation process altogether. That
consultation might lead to distorted predictions if certain votes of the court are essentially invisible
because they lead to settlement rather than a more formal judicial action.
Second, the potential for a predictability distortion may affect the way that judges themselves
behave. For example, some judges may be motivated by a desire to minimize the amount of work
that they must perform on the court. Judges interested in shirking might seek to make themselves as
predictable as possible. Predictable judges are most likely to sit on predictable panels, and
predictable panels lead to more settlement and less judicial effort. But the process of becoming
predictable itself requires judicial effort because the judge can no longer simply minimize
participation on panels by writing majority opinions when assigned and simply going along with the
majority in all other cases. Instead, the shirking judge must cultivate a perception of predictability by
writing (presumably short) dissents in some cases. In sum, whether an early announcement
procedure creates an opportunity for a shirking judge depends on whether the effort saved by being
perceived as predictable outweighs the effort required to create that perception.
Other judges may be interested in maximizing their influence on the case law. A predictability
distortion might encourage an influence maximizer to become unpredictable, which would maximize
her placement on unpredictable panels. But again, the actions required to become unpredictable
threaten to undermine the overarching goal of maximizing influence on the case law. As a result, the
influence maximizer might instead choose to write strong and consistent opinions, even though that
consistency may have the auxiliary effect of reducing the number of panels on which she sits. The
choice between these two options should depend on the overall effectiveness of the early
announcement procedure and on the number of other predictable members of the court. A choice to
become unpredictable makes sense only if the effect of the procedure is dramatic. Because of the
various barriers discussed in Part III, that condition is unlikely to be met. The predictability
distortion is therefore unlikely to affect the behavioral incentives of influence-maximizing judges.
123. See supra Part III.B.
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the oral argument pool at a higher rate than unsophisticated ones. Over
time, the cases that proceed to panel decisions on the merits will involve
relatively greater numbers of unsophisticated litigants.124
The question is whether this sophistication-based distortion should
be viewed as problematic. The answer depends in part on whether
sophisticated and unsophisticated litigants behave differently in other
relevant respects. If they do not, the distortion would not matter at all.
But this is unlikely. Instead, sophisticated litigants are likely to differ
from unsophisticated ones in terms of the quality of the claims brought
and the manner in which those claims are presented. Consider first the
quality of claims. Unsophisticated parties may be expected to appeal
relatively weaker cases. Ordinarily, rational actors should file appeals
only if the expected outcome from doing so exceeds the cost of the
appeal, and that is most likely to happen when the quality of the appeal is
high.125 But what makes parties unsophisticated under this definition is
that they are unwilling or unable to engage in the expected outcome
assessment that would lead to a post-cue response. Because the original
decision regarding the quality and likely success of the appeal is based
on a similar assessment, the lack of sophistication will sabotage both. In
short, appeals that present low quality claims are frequently a function of
misguided notions about chances for success, and unsophisticated
litigants are more likely to be misguided.
124. Assuming a simple two-party dispute, three different party arrays are possible:
Sophisticated vs. Sophisticated (SS), Sophisticated vs. Unsophisticated (SU), and Unsophisticated
vs. Unsophisticated (UU). The reaction to the announcement of a highly predictable panel is not
uniform across these arrays. In an SS dispute, both sides will use the information to settle, and the
case will not proceed to a merits decision. In a UU dispute, no settlement will result, either because
the parties will not react at all or because they will interpret the information in a self-serving way. In
an SU dispute, the results are mixed. If the panel favors the sophisticated party, no settlement will
result because the settlement demands of the sophisticated party will appear too steep to the
unsophisticated party. If the panel instead favors the unsophisticated party, settlement may occur
because the sophisticated party’s offer will look attractive relative to the unsophisticated party’s
expected outcome. Of course, a party unsophisticated in the sense of not making use of panel
announcement information may also be unsophisticated in the sense of making an accurate outcome
prediction absent that information. If so, and if the unsophisticated party has a distorted expected
outcome, then settlement may not occur because the offer may yet appear unsatisfactory. Moreover,
if the sophisticated party is aware that the other party is unsophisticated, the terms of the settlement
may be affected. Whereas the terms for an SS dispute should be very close to the new (and mutually
held) expected value, the settlement for an SU dispute may be close to the unsophisticated party’s
old expected value.
125. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 51, at 401–11. But not all appeals will involve a
positive expected value; for discussions on the possibilities for negative value suits, see id. at 419–
23; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 551–54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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Even in cases where the underlying quality of the appeal is identical,
a second sort of difference might exist: sophisticated parties may present
their appeal in a different manner than unsophisticated parties. These
differences might take various forms. One significant possibility relates
to how the issues in the case are framed for the court. Issues related to an
appeal can be presented or defended in any number of ways. Suppose,
for instance, that a case involves twelve plausible sources of error at the
trial level, but that only three stand a significant likelihood of success on
appeal. In this situation, some litigants will choose to include all twelve
issues in an attempt to convince the court that something was amiss,
while others will choose instead to focus only on the three potential
“winners” on the theory that inclusion of the other nine may undermine
their credibility in the eyes of the court. Differences of this sort are not
limited to contrasting views on litigation strategy. In a given record,
there may be numerous ways to theorize the legal claims involved. A
paradigmatic example is the choice between contract and tort theory as a
basis for relief. Whether related to strategy or to legal theory,
sophisticated parties may make different framing choices than
unsophisticated ones. And because the ability to make those choices
optimally may be related to the ability to successfully integrate new
information, sophisticated parties may do a systematically better job of
shaping arguments that will persuade an appellate court.
Finally, there may also be differences in the quality of briefing as
between unsophisticated and sophisticated litigants. These differences
might exist even if the merits of the underlying claims are identical and
even if the conception of how to frame those claims for purposes of the
appeal is also identical. Again, the intuition is that unsophisticated
litigants are likely to file briefs that are of lower quality. The basis for
that intuition is that failure to respond to panel announcement might be
viewed as a sign of incompetence, and incompetence in that respect may
be accompanied by incompetence in others.126
126. A fourth difference is that sophisticated and unsophisticated litigants might file different
types of appeals. For example, perhaps contract cases are likely to involve sophisticated parties
while employment cases are likely to involve unsophisticated ones. This difference is conceptually
distinct from the others being considered here because it affects the subject matter of the cases
presented to the court rather than the quality and manner of the case presentation itself. Shifts in
subject matter alone are likely to be problematic only if very extreme, so much so that they result in
very few cases of particular types surviving to the merits stage. Defining how many would qualify as
“very few” would depend on the importance of incrementalism and adaptiveness in a given “type” of
case. If very few cases in a particular type are filed, the court may find it difficult to perform its case
law production function adequately because it would not have sufficient occasion to issue opinions
that would clarify the law for external actors. This would be particularly so if the court feels
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Because there is reason to believe that sophisticated and
unsophisticated litigants will bring appeals that are different in quality
and in presentation, a sophistication distortion may affect the court’s
performance of its primary functions. At the extreme, the distortion
creates tension between the need for the court’s action to reflect the
participation of the litigants and the need for the court to resolve disputes
and create legal rules in accordance with public values. The need to
reflect litigant participation is connected to the norm of strong
responsiveness developed by Lon Fuller in his posthumously published
article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.127 In order to preserve and
guarantee participation by the parties, which he views as “the
distinguishing characteristic of adjudication,”128 Fuller concludes that
judges should assume a passive role and should—to the extent
possible—seek to align their case disposition with the parties’ case
presentation.129
In an article published concurrently with Fuller’s, Melvin Aron
Eisenberg strengthened the norm by arguing that responsiveness to
parties—and not simply participation by parties—is what defines
adjudication as a tool of dispute resolution. A court fulfills its dispute
resolution function only to the extent that it resolves the dispute that the
parties have perceived and presented, and to that end it does well to
respond as directly as possible.130
Although implicit in the work of both Fuller and Eisenberg, more
recent arguments in favor of the norm of strong responsiveness have
been explicitly rooted in terms of legitimacy. For instance, Larry Solum
has explored the link between strong responsiveness and perceptions of
legitimacy by participants in the adjudicative process.131 Participants
will view the resolution of their dispute as legitimate only if they
constrained by notions of minimalism. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New
Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000).
127. See Fuller, supra note 104, at 353.
128. Id. at 364.
129. Id. at 388. Fuller acknowledges that it is not always possible to structure disposition in
this way, but he nevertheless urges courts to “work toward an achievement of the closest
approximation of it.” Id.
130. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative
Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 413 (1978) (arguing that strong
responsiveness is a necessary component of the court’s dispute resolution function “insofar as the
parties contemplate that the court will settle their dispute on the basis of the issues as the parties see
them”).
131. Solum, supra note 107, at 275.
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participate in the resolution process in a meaningful way, and
responsiveness is one sure way to assure parties that that condition has
been met. Systematic deviations from strong responsiveness threaten to
disrupt legitimacy on the part of those who rely on the courts to resolve
disputes. Because parties will not voluntarily submit to illegitimate forms
of adjudication, instability would follow.
Strong responsiveness may also be necessary to secure legitimacy in
the eyes of nonparticipants. Christopher Peters has defended strong
responsiveness as a guarantor of the democratic legitimacy of rules
created and imposed by an independent and politically insulated judicial
branch.132 Responding to criticisms of adjudication as a fundamentally
nondemocratic enterprise, Peters emphasizes the involvement throughout
the adjudication process of interested parties,133 who perform valuable
functions, including initiating a case, framing the issues it presents, and
representing the various interests implicated by those issues.134 Each of
those functions limits the court’s discretion in fashioning a decisional
rule that will bind other parties, but those limits are effective only to the
extent that the court actually respects the parties’ input. Strong
responsiveness thus emerges as an essential component of the court’s
legitimate exercise of its case law production function.135
Whatever its merits in the abstract, strict adherence to a norm of
strong responsiveness is not always desirable. Of particular relevance
here, the norm makes sense only when the quality of the appeals being
decided is high. Consider dispute resolution: Fuller proposes that courts
are primarily engaged in the arbitration of claims presented by competing
parties. That is all well and good, but precisely how are those competing
claims to be resolved? Viewed narrowly, this is a question of minimal
significance; so long as the parties are provided the opportunity to
participate, and so long as the resolution is accepted by the parties

132. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 349
(1997).
133. Id. at 334. To ensure that the parties to disputes are indeed interested, Peters
understandably encourages strict application of existing justiciability doctrines. Id. at 428.
134. Indeed, in Peters’s view, parties effectively “serve as interest representatives of
subsequent litigants in much the same way that we expect our elected legislators to serve as interest
representatives of their constituents.” Id. at 347.
135. Peters identifies two further components that are essential to his model of adjudication as
representation. First, courts must correctly apply the doctrine of stare decisis such that a decision
binds “only those future parties who are similarly situated to the original litigants in every material
way.” Id. at 375 (emphasis omitted). Second, the “conduct of the parties in litigating the precedential
case [must] meet a threshold standard of adequacy.” Id. at 376 (emphasis omitted).
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themselves, the nature and manner of the resolution is irrelevant. Indeed,
this seems to be Fuller’s view, and his norms of attention, explanation,
and strong responsiveness are most consistent with a model of dispute
resolution understood in this narrow sense. But perhaps dispute
resolution requires something more. Viewed more broadly, proper
resolution of competing claims must draw on, and be representative of,
public values. This is particularly true in so-called “public law” cases,
where interests other than those presented by the two sides may be
implicated and may need to be accounted for.136 But it may be true in
more traditional cases as well. According to Owen Fiss, perhaps the most
ardent proponent of this view, “all rights enforced by courts are
public.”137 If so, then the nature of the dispute resolution is a matter of
concern after all; we feel confident that the dispute has been resolved
properly only if the resolution reflects public values, and that is most
likely to occur when those values have been adequately represented. This
view of dispute resolution is not wholly inconsistent with strong
responsiveness, but it does impose a natural condition: the quality of
representation must be adequate.138 When that condition is met, the
nature of the adversarial structure will ensure that the court is informed
of the public values implicated.139 But when it is not, a court runs a risk
of imposing an undesirable resolution if it considers the case strictly as it
is presented and framed by the participants.
The problem in terms of case law production is similar. Tension
between strong responsiveness and case law production has long been
recognized. As described by Chad Oldfather, the tension exists

136. The public law model of adjudication is most closely associated with Abram Chayes. See
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
137. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (1979). Fiss’s view of adjudication led him to grossly minimize the court’s
dispute resolution function. Id. at 29 (“[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to
resolve disputes.”). For that reason, he is often described as being concerned primarily with the
court’s “lawmaking” function rather than its dispute resolution function. See Oldfather, supra note
104, at 148–49. But of course courts must be in the business of resolving disputes at least at some
nominal level, since by constitutional mandate there must be a dispute before there can be any court
action at all. And the emphasis placed on public values by Fiss can easily be framed in terms of a
conception of how that resolution ought to occur.
138. In pure “public law” cases, even this condition may not be enough to permit resolution
through responsiveness. In these situations, the large number of public interests involved may not be
adequately represented by the nominal parties to the dispute, and the court may, therefore, need to
“construct a broader representational framework” to ensure that those interests are considered. Fiss,
supra note 137, at 26.
139. Chayes, supra note 136, at 1308.
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for the simple reason that whatever rules the court generates as a result
of its resolution of the specific dispute before it must be of the sort that
can be applied to similar disputes in the future. If the dispute before the
court is somehow not representative of the broader category of disputes
of which it is a part, or if the parties’ arguments fail to address issues
that are critical to the formulation of a rule that must be applied across
a range of future disputes, then strong responsiveness could lead to a
decision that is based on an incomplete set of inputs and thus generate
law that is inappropriate to the needs of future disputants.140

Critics of strong responsiveness have pointed to this tension as a reason
to abandon the norm altogether.141 Defenders of the norm have
predictably been less categorical but have recognized that deviations may
be necessary where the potential for tension is particularly acute.142 The
most commonly recognized deviation of this sort is in pure public law
cases, but the potential for tension is also acute where quality of
participation is low. In Eisenberg’s formulation, “[t]he force of this norm
[of strong responsiveness] may . . . vary according to the nature of the
inquiry and the quality of the parties’ participation.”143
The demands of both dispute resolution and case law production
suggest that a quality condition must be met before a norm of strong
responsiveness is imposed. If that condition is not met, the court must
make a choice. One option is to adhere to the norm of strong
responsiveness and to take on the risk that the outcome would be
problematic in terms of case law production or dispute resolution, at least
if the proper performance of those tasks is understood as encompassing
some notion of public values. The other option is to forego the norm of
strong responsiveness in order to perform the dispute resolution and case
law production functions effectively. When low quality appeals appear
only periodically on a court’s docket, neither option is fraught with peril;
occasional deviations from strong responsiveness are unlikely to generate
systemic turbulence, and adherence to the norm, even where the court

140. See Oldfather, supra note 104, at 142.
141. Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 413–14.
142. Again, the classic deviation is in “public law” cases, which by their nature affect a large
group of parties not directly involved in the dispute. See id. at 428 (concluding that in public law
cases, “the judge may subordinate the norm of settling the dispute that has been put to him, on the
basis of the issues put to him, in favor of the function of making rules that are responsive to public
needs”).
143. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). Peters also recognizes that his model of adjudication that
calls for strong responsiveness as a guarantor of legitimacy is desirable only when the quality of
representation has been adequate. See Peters, supra note 132, at 376.
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views the case far differently, is made palatable by the availability of
nonprecedential opinions.144
But the situation may be quite different if the sophistication
distortion operates to reduce the general quality of both the claims
presented and the advocacy on behalf of those claims. At a certain point,
that denigration will threaten the court’s ability to perform its functions
while remaining strongly responsive. Faced with appeals of consistently
low quality, a court may opt to hold fast to the norm of responsiveness.
But one suspects that adherence would be largely formal. That is, the
court may continue to frame its decisions in the parties’ terms even while
basing those decisions on considerations not presented by the parties.
Such an approach would tend to preserve legitimacy in the eyes of
participants, and it might even be viewed as satisfactory in terms of
dispute resolution because the true resolution of the dispute would reflect
public values. But the disconnect between the true basis for the decision
and its formal terms—or put differently, the absence of judicial candor—
is problematic in terms of the court’s case law production function, at
least in the sense that it frustrates the ability of future litigants to predict
how the court will behave going forward.145 An even more likely
scenario is that a court faced with consistently low quality appeals would
begin to systematically deviate from the norm of strong responsiveness.
But such deviations would come at a price. Parties involved in disputes
would begin to view the court’s resolution as illegitimate if the court’s
output does not reflect the parties’ input. More importantly, the rules
created by the court may be viewed as less legitimate by external actors
because they do not grow out of a representational process.

144. Courts may choose to adhere to the litigants’ conception of a case even when they
disagree with it if they feel that there is little to be gained by a deviation from the norm. The
availability of the nonprecedential opinion makes this artificial adherence relatively costless—it
preserves legitimacy in the eyes of litigants without interfering with the court’s case law production
function precisely because the court chooses to forego its case law production function in appeals
that it denotes as nonprecedential. This approach is acceptable largely because the court is still able
to perform its case law production function effectively while deciding the other appeals on its
docket.
145. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 147 (1996)
(“Prolixity and lack of candor are not mere inelegances in judicial opinions. They increase the time
required for reading . . . [a]nd they reduce the opinion’s usefulness as a guide to what the judges are
likely to do in future cases.”). The lack of candor may create additional problems in terms of the
court’s legitimacy or integrity. For defenses of a requirement of judicial candor in these terms, see,
for example, Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory
Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 401–02 (1989).
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The sophistication distortion is similar to the distortion created by
nonuniform panel predictability in the sense that both have the potential
to create serious jurisprudential problems in the extreme case. But the
two are also similar in the sense that the extreme case is very unlikely. In
terms of the sophistication distortion, the extreme case is created not by
an abundance of low quality appeals but by the dearth of high quality
ones. So long as a court is presented with a sufficient number of high
quality appeals, it can use those cases to satisfy the demands of case law
production while remaining responsive to litigant participation. As for
the low quality appeals, it can simply minimize them by issuing narrow
(and, if the mechanism is available, nonprecedential) opinions. Put
differently, the extreme case will arise only if the rule works extremely
well among the pool of sophisticated litigants—so well that cases
involving those litigants become scarce. That is unlikely because of the
existence of the other intractable barriers discussed in Part III. For
example, so long as a minimum condition of unpredictability among the
panels is met, the early announcement policy will not winnow the pool of
sophisticated appeals to a problematic level. The court may find itself
dealing with a relatively larger percentage of low-quality appeals, but it
will avoid large-scale problems of legitimacy and case law production.
C. The Motivation Distortion
A final distortion stems from the fact that parties pursue cases for
different reasons. Many cases involve litigants who simply view a legal
judgment as instrumental—for example, as a way to extract or withhold
money from the other party. Litigants thus described have no preference
regarding the form of the instrument that guarantees the relief sought;
settlement is just as good as judgment, so long as the terms are
identical—or, more accurately, so long as the terms vary only by the
difference in the cost of procuring them. Panel announcement is most
likely to offer a valuable cue to these litigants, precisely because they
view a reliable prediction about the judgment as functionally equivalent
to the judgment itself.
In contrast, litigants who prefer judgments to settlements will be less
responsive to early announcement. Litigants may have such a preference
for several reasons. For example, they may prefer a judgment because
they are interested in a formal or third-party recognition of a wrong.
Litigants pursuing discrimination or civil rights claims frequently fit this
description. Or litigants may prefer judgment because they have an
interest in the creation of precedent for future cases. Whatever the
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reason, judgment-preferring litigants may not settle, even if the likely
outcome is clarified by panel announcement, because settlement is an
imperfect substitute for judgment.
These motivational differences should mean that litigants preferring
judgments are overrepresented among the pool of cases that proceed to
oral argument, even absent an early announcement procedure.146 But that
overrepresentation should be even more pronounced after such a
procedure is introduced. This could affect case distribution in at least two
respects. First, it may affect the content mix of the oral argument pool. If
judgment-neutral and judgment-preferring litigants are evenly distributed
among cases, the overrepresentation does not matter much. But one
would suspect that the distribution is not even.147 Rather, litigants who
prefer judgment may be overrepresented in certain classes of cases
(again, perhaps employment discrimination), so the introduction of the
procedure may have the side effect of increasing the percentage of those
classes of cases in the oral argument pool.148 Second, the motivation
distortion may affect the legal rules reached by the court. Case selection
models that account for litigants who value the creation of precedent
have suggested that cases that go to trial will produce outcomes that
disproportionately favor those litigants.149 The early announcement
procedure may amplify that effect because it increases the portion of
cases in the oral argument pool that fail to settle because one side is
interested in the precedent-value of a judgment. More generally, by
decreasing the impact of appeals explained by divergent expectations, the
procedure may increase the case selection impact of other settlementretarding factors like interest in precedent or interest in the judgment per
se.150

146. Indeed, case selection models focusing on external effects have made similar predictions
for trial-level cases. See, e.g., Kobayashi, supra note 53, at 33.
147. For a discussion about how the selection of cases at the trial level is affected by
differences in plaintiffs’ “taste for litigiousness,” and more specifically how those differences may
relate to the subject matter of the dispute, see Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious
Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92 (1997).
148. See supra note 126.
149. See, e.g., Kobayashi, supra note 53, at 37 (“The selection of cases for litigation . . . is
biased toward those cases likely to result in holdings favorable to the repeat litigant.”); Lederman,
supra note 53, at 323–24 (“[C]ases that go to trial will tend to be . . . those cases in which the
outcome is disproportionately likely to favor the ‘repeat player,’ that is, the party with an interest in
establishing a precedent.”).
150. Consider again the case selection models discussed supra note 53. Put in those terms, the
suggestion here is that the procedure should increase the explanatory power of an “asymmetric
stakes” or “external effects” model.
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V. CONCLUSION
The theoretical case for a settlement effect generated by early panel
announcement is based on a straightforward model of cue and response.
The court provides an informational cue to litigants when it discloses
panel composition, and it assumes that some litigants will seek
settlement in response because they will perceive the information as
relevant to the appeal’s likely outcome. In practice, the cue and response
mechanism appears to be operating in some cases, although not in
overwhelming fashion. This Article has attempted to accomplish two
goals: to explore barriers that prevent the mechanism from having greater
effect and to explore ways that those barriers make the mechanism’s
limited effect nonrandom.
Some barriers are created by weaknesses in the cue, while others are
created by weaknesses in litigants’ ability to interpret and respond to the
cue. Recognizing the prevalence of these barriers could lead the way to
procedural modifications designed to alleviate them, but effective yet
acceptable modifications are difficult to imagine. Improving
effectiveness would require the court to embrace or acknowledge the
attitudinal model, and that almost certainly represents an unacceptable
cost. Instead, the barriers appear intractable, and their intractability
suggests various distortions generated by the procedure’s limited effect.
So what does all of this say about whether an early announcement
procedure is worthwhile? The answer to that question depends to some
extent on further empirical study of the contours of the various
distortions described here, and to some extent on a subjective evaluation
about the value or danger of those distortions. At the margins, the
procedure may well promote panels that are more diverse, and that
benefit may outweigh the costs of increased pandering during argument
and an increased number of unsophisticated appeals. But my primary
intention here is not to resolve that question definitively; rather, it is to
suggest that a full understanding of the procedure’s tradeoffs is
considerably more complicated than a simple choice between attorney
pandering and decreased caseload.
This connects to a final, larger point. As the appellate caseload
continues to rise and as other mechanisms for dealing with the caseload
crunch come under pressure,151 courts can be expected to consider new

151. As mentioned supra note 9, the oft-used technique of filing a short unpublished opinion
to dispose of straightforward appeals has arguably lost some of its luster given the recent adoption of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. In addition, the Supreme Court has recently been creating
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ways that they might exercise control over internal rules and procedures
to procure relief. But such efforts are fraught with peril. Maneuvering
within the space created by local rulemaking authority in an effort to
generate caseload reductions can be a dangerous business with
jurisprudential implications. Indirect maneuvers such as cue and
response mechanisms are particularly problematic because they are not
self-executing; instead, the court must rely on litigants to receive the cue,
process it accurately, and react to it rationally. But if parties do not
receive, process, and react uniformly—and it is a near-sure bet that they
do not—then the court’s decision to provide information alters the pool
of cases that remain. In short, courts should think carefully about how the
introduction of local rules and procedures, and particularly those that
depend on litigant response, may ultimately affect the cases they hear
and the way they decide them.

pressure on lower courts to use abstention doctrines—which can be used by courts to dispose of
cases in certain contexts—more sparingly. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006)
(narrowing the probate exception to federal jurisdiction); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (reading the Rooker-Feldman doctrine narrowly).
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